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DISCOVERY IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
.JERRY E. NORTONt
"Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the
charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his
defense. He is immune from question or comment on
his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole
evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and
make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been
able to see .... Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment
that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution
of crime."
-Learned Hand'
"This anachronistic apprehension that liberal dis-
covery if extended to criminal causes will "inevitably"
bring the serious and sinister dangers of perjury in its
wake will seem strange to many when coming from
this court which has been generally commended for
its aggressive sponsorship of liberal discovery and
effective pretrial procedures in civil causes and can
point to the solid evidence of its beneficial results to
the cause of justice without that defeat of justice
through perjury foretold by the prophets of doom. It
will be difficult to understand why, without proof
but only from some visceral augury, we now assume that
the hazard is so much greater in criminal causes....
Certainly without actual evidence and upon conjecture
merely, and in the face of the contrary proof of our
experience in civil causes, we ought not in criminal
causes, where even life itself may be at stake, forswear
in the absence of clearly established danger a tool so
useful in guarding against the chance that a trial will
be a lottery or mere game of wits and the result at
the mercy of the mischiefs of surprise. We must remem-
ber that society's interest is equally that the innocent
shall not suffer and not alone that the guilty shall
not escape. Discovery, basically a tool for truth, is
the most effective device yet devised for the reduction
of the aspect of the adversary element to a minimum."
-William J. Brennan2
t Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College
of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
[This article is an expansion and up-to-date revision
of a thesis prepared by Professor Norton in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for a Master of Laws
degree which he received from Northwestern Univer-
sity in 1967.]
1 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646,649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923).
The adjoining quotations suggest that the con-
troversy over the proper scope of criminal dis-
covery is grounded in differing conceptions of the
premises underlying the criminal process. If one
begins with the belief that the criminal process is
an adversary process between two relatively equal
parties and that the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination and other consttutional rights
give him a great advantage over the prosecution,
it is almost inevitable that the conclusion will be
that the scope of criminal discovery should not be
expanded. However, if one places an affirmative
duty upon the state to guarantee that the de-
fendant receive a fair trial and pictures the
criminal process as an unequal contest between
the state with its immense investigatory resources
and an often poor and uneducated defendant, the
opposite conclusion is inevitable.
Criminal discovery in the United States has
historically been premised on the former view of
the criminal process. This article will examine the
development and status of criminal discovery in
the United States and its underlying policy bases.
The examination will encompass both constitu-
tional requirements and the practical consequences
of differing standards of disclosure. The article will
conclude with a review of a comprehensive pro-
posal which seeks to accomodate the dictates of the
Constitution and fairness to the defendant with
the preservation of ordered liberty.
THE Co0moN LAW AND THE ADVERSARY PRocEss
In order to understand the reluctance of courts
and legislatures to permit discovery in criminal
cases, it is necessary to view the question against
the background of the common law and its
dependence upon the adversary process. Surprise,
rather than being regarded as the enemy of truth,
was considered its strongest ally. Any proposal
tending to reduce the element of surprise was
viewed with great alarm. When the defendant,
in 1792 in King v. Holland,' requested that he be
2 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 228-229, 98 A.2d 881,
894-895 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
King v. Holland, 4 Durn. & East 691, 100 Eng.
Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
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allowed to examine the report of a board of inquiry
which had investigated his activities as an official
of the East India Company, Lord Kenyon was
incredulous.4
I am extremely clear that we ought not to
grant this application. There is not principle
or precedent to warrant it. Nor was such a
motion as the present ever made; and if we
were to grant it, it would subvert the whole
system of criminal law.
This prohibition of discovery applied equally to
both parties in the criminal action. In 1748, in
Rex v. Purnell,5 the King's Bench denied the
application of the Attorney General to be allowed
to inspect the statutes and archives of Oxford
University, of which one of the defendants was
Vice-Chancellor. The court stated that
we all agree the rule could not be granted,
because it was a criminal proceeding, and
that the motion was to make the defendants
furnish evidence against themselves.
6
Despite this language and the further statement
in Rex v. Purnell that "no man is bound to accuse
himself," 7 extremely ruthless extrajudicial criminal
interrogations were permitted in that day. As
characterized by Yale Kamisar, the English
courts of that day were concerned only with what
occurred in the "mansions" of the law and prag-
matically ignored the "gatehouses." 8 Perhaps also,
attempts to induce or coerce the defendant to
confess were not viewed as demanding disclosures
likely to "subvert the whole system of criminal
law." 9 Whatever the reason, the confession was an
early exception to the common law rule prohibiting
discovery in criminal cases.
Earlier, Parliament had made other exceptions
in cases of treason. In 1695 it passed a statute
requiring delivery to a defendant accused of high
treason 9 a copy of the indictment five days before
trial. In 1708 a statute was passed extending this
privilege to include misprision of treason and
4 Id. at 692, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1249.
5 Rex v. Purnell, 1 Wils. 239, 95 Eng. Rep. 595
(K.B. 1748).
6 Id. at 242, 95 Eng. Rep. at 597.
7Id. at 241, 95 Eng. Rep. at 596.
8 See Y. KAmsA, CmirnAL JusTicE iN ORr Tbm,
EQUAL JusTIcE rN Tim GATEHOUSES AND MANsioNs
or AnEmRcAN CRMnNAL PROcEDURE: FROM PowELL
To GiDEoN, FROM ESCOBEDO TO ... (Howard ed. 1965).
0 For a history of confessions under English law,
see 3 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 817-20 (3d ed. 1940).
10 Act for Trials in cases of Treason, 7 & 8 W. 3,
c. 3 (1695).
requiring delivery of the copy of the indictment
ten days before trial." The most significant
change brought about by the statute of 1708,
however, was the requirement that such defendants
were also to be supplied with a list of witnesses to
testify for the prosecution at trial. It has been
suggested that this exception to the common law
rule was dictated by the uncertainties of political
life at the turn of the eighteenth century which
caused members of Parliament to provide protec-
tion in case they might be required to answer
charges of high treason.12
Thus, at the time of the American revolution,
no criminal discovery existed except in cases
involving treason or extrajudicial confession.
In England, this prohibition upon discovery was
retained for approximately fifty years. In the mid-
nineteenth century, acts of Parliament, court rules
and changes in professional practices dramatically
changed the law. The institution of the grand jury
declined and was replaced by a form of preliminary
hearing'3 At the English preliminary hearing
today, unlike the American practice, the prosecu-
tion produces all witnesses it intends to call at
trial, and the testimony of each is reduced to a
summary which the witness signs. This is similiar
to a deposition, although there is no verbatim
record of the witness's testimony.'
4
In addition to the preliminary hearing, a
professional practice of disclosure developed in
England. The prosecutor is expected to disclose
to the defense attorney the names and addresses o
persons having information which may be useful
to the defense. He is also expected to make
medical and police laboratory reports available to
the defense, as well as copies of the written state-
ments of any defendant.' At the trial, if a witness
contradicts a prior statement, the prosecutor is
expected to hand the statement to defense counsel
for purposes of cross-examination. 6
In the United States, the institution of the
1 Act for Improving the Union of the Two Kingdoms,
7 Anne, c. 21, § 11 (1708).
"1 STErHEN, HiSTORY OF TH CRnm'riAL LAW Or
ENGLAND 237-38 (1883).
13 See 6 WIrGmoE, EVIDENcE, § 1850 (3d ed. 1940);
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery
in England, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 749 (1964); Adminis-
tration of Justice (Misc. Provisons) Act, 1933, 23 and
24 Geo 5, c. 36 § 1. See generally Burrows, Criminal
Law and Procedure 51 L.Q. REv. 36, 49-52 (1935);
Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury,
29J. Cium.L.C. &P.S.3 (1938).
14 Traynor, supra note 13, at 754.
15 Id. at 761.
16Id. at 763.
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grand jury has largely been preserved. Even where
the preliminary hearing has been substitutdd for it,
however, the common law rule regarding discovery
remained relatively undisturbed, at least well into
the twentieth century. In 1912 the Minnesota
Supreme Court was shocked by the ruling of a trial
court which directed the prosecution to give a
copy of the defendant's testimony before a state
fire marshall to the defendant's attorney. The
appellate court said "if the practice be once
adopted that an indicted person is entitled to be
furnished with some evidence in the possession of
the county attorney, where is the line to be
drawn?"17 The court's attitude toward this threat
to the adversary process was very much like that
of the King's Bench in the case of King v. Hollandn s
more than a century earlier.
In 1927, some change became apparent when
Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals
reviewed the actions of a trial court which ordered
the prosecution to deliver to the defense copies of
statements of an alleged accomplice and results of
certain examinations of the victim.19 justice
Cardozo held the trial court in error. He traced
the history of civil discovery from equit3y to
statutory codification. Because discovery is in
derogation of the common law, he said, it may be
imposed only by statute. justice Cardozo noted,
however, that some courts were beginning to allow
limited discovery. "The beginnings or at least the
glimmerings of such a doctrine are to be found, as
we have seen, in courts other than our own." 2°
Wigmore, an early advocate *of more liberal
discovery practices, criticized the narrow view
taken by justice Cardozo.
But what at least ought to be clear is that the
judiciary power, as exercised by the Supreme
Court, is ample to grant such inspection in
proper cases without waiting for a remedial
statute. The question is one of policy, not of
power.
And so it is strange to find a Supreme
Court in a leading and scholarly opinion
accepting impotently the view that the
judiciary must wait on the Legislature for
doing justice in such cases....2
17 State ex rel. Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384,
386, 135 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1912).
184 Dum. & East 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B.
1792).
1People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y.
24, 156 N.E. 84,52 A. L. R. 200 (1927)
20 Id. at 32, 156 N.E. at 86.
21 Wigmore, supra note 13 at 395.
But, most courts continued to oppose the
introduction of discovery into criminal procedure.
More specific objections to discovery replaced
emotional rejection based on the adversary
traditions. Many judges, including Learned Hand,
felt that any disadvantage which the criminal
defendant may suffer was more than compensated
by other procedural safeguards which he enjoyed.
22
The supporters of liberalized discovery have
argued that in practice any -imagined balance
between the parties has turned to the advantage
of the state. 2 They-point out that law enforcement
agencies are at a distinct advantage in obtaining
evidence. First, the law enforcement agency is
often at the scene of the crime shortly after its
commission. While at the scene, the police have
better access to witnesses with fresher recollections.
They are authorized to confiscate removable
evidence. In addition, the financial and investiga-
tory resources of law enforcement agencies permit
an extensive analysis of all relevant evidence.
The defendant has the option of hiring a private
unvestigator. However, the investigator will
probably get to the scene long after the occurrence
of the crime and after the police have made their
investigation and removed' all relevant physical
evidence. The defendant's investigator may have
difficulty viewing the scene if it is on private
property. Witnesses may be less accessible; their
recollections will probably be less precise. Indeed
they may choose not to cooperate at all with the
defendant's investigator." However, it may all be
irrelevant if, as is often the case, the defendant is
unable to afford an investigator or is incarcerated
pending trial.
'The defendant is helpless to cope with the
uncooperative witness while the prosecutor has
numerous means to compel testimony. First, there
is the possibility of coroner's inquest or a pre-
liminary hearing 25 And if the prosecution prefers
'2See n. 1 supra, and accompanying text. See also,
United States v. Dilliard, 101 F.2d 829, 837 (2d Cir.
1938).
See more extended discussions of these arguments
in Loisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or
Apparent?, 49 CAm. L. Rv. 56, 86-90 (1961); Gold-
stein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YAxE L. J. 1149, 1180-99
(1960).
2"Louisell, supra note 23, at 87; INAu AND REm,
ClaMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CoWEssIONs 122
(2d ed. 1967).
25LouiseHl, supra note 23, at 87. Professor Pye has
mentioned that some prosecutors also resort to an
"informal subpoena" in order to persuade witnesses
to submit to questioning. Pye, The Defendant's Case
for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82, 84 (1963).
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not to have the defense present, some jurisdictions
allow the prosecution to take testimony while
the defendant and his attorney are excluded.' 6 The
uncooperative witness can be subpoenaed to appear
before the grand jury and required to testify, again
without the presence of the defense. The defense
cannot, usually, discover the grand jury minutes.n
Many states require that the defendant give
notice of intended alibi" or insanity" defenses."
The prosecution's burden, in bringing a charge, in
contrast, has been substantially lessened.8 Mere
recitation of the statute may be a sufficient pleading
of the charge.3 Amendments to the indictment or
information are liberally allowed; duplicity and
variances are no longer serious defects. 3 Liberal
pleading rules deprive the defendant of effective
notice of the circumstances of the offense. It is also
argued that the alleged balance in criminal
proceedings is not maintained in practice by the
requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and the presumption of innocence since the jury
probably does not apply these concepts effec-
tively.u
Proponents of expanded discovery also refute
the balance of advantage or "handicap" theories
by emphasizing their irrelevance. The important
factor is whether expanded discovery turns the
balance more toward the truth.3' The criminal
trial should not be characterized as a mere game
26 See, e.g. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 203-13 (1965);
K". STAT. ANN. § 62-301 (1963), Handler, The
Constitutionality of Investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission, 28 CotLum. L. REv. 708, 905, 925-928
(1928).
27Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395 (1959); and see United States v. Proctor &
Gamble Co. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
2" See, e.g. N.Y. CoDE CGlm. PRoc. § 295-1 (1935).
29 See, e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 15, § 423 (1940). For a
list of the statutes, see State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3,
11-14, 210 A. 2d 763, 767, n. 1 (1965); for a discussion
of the constitutionality of such a requirement, see 5
Ams. Camn. L. Q. 46 (1966).
30 See generally, Fletcher, Pre-trial Discovery in
State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. R1v. 293, 315-16
(1963).
"1 Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149,
1175-1178 (1960).
2 See e.g. KAIs. STAT. ANN. § 62-1009, n. 2, (1962).
"See e.g. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-5 (1967).
3 See Goldstein, supra note 31, at 1186.
"5 Louisell, supra note 23, at 97. But, of course, the
function of the defense attorney is not necessarily to
search for truth, but rather it may simply be to require
the prosecution to prove the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt within the law. See Flannery, Prosecutors;
Position: 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963); Starrs, Professional
Responsibility: Three Basic Propositions, 5 As,. Camt.
L. Q. 17 (1966).
in which the parties are controlled by rules
constructed solely to create a balance between the
two sides. Rather, the proceeding should be
directed toward uncovering truth, and the merits
of any proposed change in discovery rules should
be judged according to the potential of the change
toward promoting this objective.
While many courts and prosecutors agree that
pretrial discovery is justifiable if it promotes an
objective finding of the truth, those opposing
liberalized discovery fear that it would often defeat,
not aid, the determination of truth. This fear was
clearly stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
State v. Tune. 6
In criminal proceedings long experience has
taught the courts that often discovery will
lead not to honest fact-finding, but on the
contrary to perjury and the suppression of
evidence. Thus the criminal who is aware of
the whole case against him will often procure
perjured testimony in order to set up a false
defense .... Another result of full discovery
would be that the criminal defendant who is
informed of the names of all of the State's
witnesses may take steps to bribe or frighten
them into giving perjured testimony or into
absenting themselves so that they are un-
available to testify. Moreover, many witnesses,
if they know that the defendant will have
knowledge of their names prior to trial, will be
reluctant to come forward with information
during the investigation of the crime.... All
these dangers are more inherent in criminal
proceedings.... To permit unqualified dis-
closure of all statements and information in
the hands of the State would go far beyond
what is required in civil cases; it would defeat
the very ends of justice. 7
Supporters of extended discovery have acknowl-
edged the problem of possible intimidation or
bribery of witnesses which can affect a witness's
willingness to testify. This risk may be greatest
in cases involving organized crime, but these
instances should not be the basis for refusing
discovery in the great majority of criminal
proceedings." This position has led to Louisell's
proposal that discovery in "typical" criminal
36 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, (1953). But see State v.
Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313, (1958); State v.
Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568 (1951).
3713 N.J. at 210-11, 98 A.2d 884.
'7Louisell, supra note 23, at 98-101.
[Vol 61
CRIfINAL DISCOVERY
cases should be as broad as in civil cases.3 In
those circumstances where the prosecutiori clearly
demonstrates to the court that because of the
"nature of the accused's associations and repre-
sentatives" there would be a possibility of coercing
witnesses or procuring perjured testimony, dis-
covery should be withheld or restricted. 40 Such
flexibility would reduce the dangers of abuse in
exceptional cases. As Justice Brennan pointed out
in his dissent to State v. Tune 4 the extension of
civil discovery did not result in the abuses raised
by the opponents of that innovation.4 Neither has
it caused major problems in criminal discovery in
England or Canada.4
The possibility that a dishonest accused will
misuse such an opportunity is not reason for.
commiting the injustice of refusing the honest
accused a fair means of clearing himself. That
argument is outworn; it was the basis (and
with equal logic) for the one-time refusal of the
criminal law... to allow the accused to
produce any witnesses at all 4
Another fear is that extensive discovery pro-
cedures may encourage sloth and discourage
documentation.45 Experience with the new civil
rules should alleviate this concern. Referring
particularly to the fear of sloth, one writer ob-
served:
How often in civil litigation will a lawyer
depend on an adversary's response to an
interrogatory, rather than go himself directly
to a source reasonably available to him?
Certainly those who would abolish civil
discovery on the "diligence" argument are
either few in number or feeble in protest.46
In order to minimize disclosures under a liberal
discovery rule, attorneys may refrain from prepar-
29 Id. at 100.
'0 Id. at 100-1. See Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19
HA sT. L.J. 865, 890 (1968) for an alternative to the
Louisell theory on the ground that it may constitute
a denial of equal protection. As an alternative the
author then proposes that the judge assess the dangers
of discovery in light of the particular attorney request-
ing discovery, the association and character of the
accused and the crime with which he is charged and
the danger of hampering related prosecution. Id. at
891-2.
' 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
42Id. at 228, 98 A.2d at 894 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
See Traynor, supra note 13 at 752, n. 19 and text.
U Dean Wigmore as quoted by Mr. Justice Brennan
in 33 F.R.D. 47, 63 (1963).45 Louisell, supra note 23 at 94.
16 Id. at 95.
ing documents on the case. Yet, this problem is
avoidable if the rules would protect the attorney's
"work product." 0
The often inadequately considered belief that
discovery cannot be reciprocal frequently per-
suades courts to refuse to extend criminal dis-
covery. 4 Understandably courts are reluctant to
establish rules which will operate to the advantage
of only one of the parties. They will deny discovery
by assigning proprietary rights in certain informa-
tion to the parties." In State v. Rkoads," the
defendant received.permission to examine, among
other things, the transcript of a witness's interview.
In sustaining state exceptions to the trial court's
ruling, the court said,
The state cannot compel the prisoner at the
bar to submit his private papers or memoranda
to the state for use or even examination, for
he-cannot be required to testify in the case, nor
to furnish evidence against himself. Then why
should the accused be allowed to rummage
through the private papers of the prosecuting
attorney? Neither the sublime teachings of the
Golden Rule to which we have been referred,
nor the supposed sense of. fair play, can be so
perverted as to sanction the demands allowed
in this case."
However this decision was recently overruled in
State v. White52 where the Ohio Supreme Court
ordered the trial court to allow the defendant to
inspect the recorded pretrial statements of a key
witness as well as to conduct an in camera inspec-
tion of the pretrial statement of other witnesses.0
The standard for determining t e defendant's
right to inspect the statement was whether the
court, in the in camera proceeding, finds variation
between the statements and the testimony
sufficient to deprive the defendant of due process
of law and prohibit him from receiving a fair
trial." The proprietary implications of the Rhoads
decision were quite properly discarded. As Pro-
4 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
4Louisell, supra note 23 at 91-92.
49 Id. at 96.
10 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910).
51 Id. at 425, 91 N.E. at 192.
62 15 Ohio St. 2d 146, 239 N.E.2d 65 (1968).
53Id. at 158, 239 N.E.2d at 74. But see, Coleman v.
Maxwell, 399 F.2d 662, 664-5 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied 393 U.S. 1058 (1969).
5 State v. White, 15 Ohio St. 2d 146, 159, 239 N.E.2d
65 (1968). Inconsistencies between testimony and
pre-trial statements now require in camera inspection
although private papers and work product are-not
subject to defense scrutiny.
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fessor Louiseil points out, unlike the context of
the civil proceeding where one may have a property
interest in some evidence, 55 the evidence of the
prosecution belongs to the public. 56 The state
represents the interests of all the people including
the defendant's. The state's interest is to see that
justice is done and its evidence should be accessible
to ally. The court also disregarded the notion that
reciprocity plays any role in this circumstance. The
defendant's right against self-incrimination 5s can-
not be properly used by the prosecution in this
case to justify the refusal to produce the state-
ments.59
It is dear also that the Supreme Court, which
stated in Brady v. Maryland0 that "the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment ... ," 61 would not regard a state's
proprietary interest, or the defendant's privilege
not to testify against himself, a justification for
suppressing evidence favorable to the accused.
There are some indications, especially in the
state courts, that the door to criminal discovery
is being nudged open. In California, People v.
Riser62 provided the defendant with the right to
obtain any pre-trial statements of prosecution
witnesses at trial. The court reasoned that
the State has no interest in denying the
accused access to all evidence that can throw
light on issues in the case.... To deny
flatly any right of production on the grounds
that an imbalance would be created between
the advantages of prosecution and defense
would be to lose sight of the true purpose
of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of fact.13
Later decisons established for the defendant the
right to inspect his statements to the police,6 the
55 Louisell, supra note 23 at 96-7.
5 1 Id. at 97.
17 See Moore, Criminal Disco;very, 19 Hast. L.J.
865, 880 (1968).
11The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution pro-
vides, in part, that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself...."
19 See Moore, supra note 57, at 899-909.
60 373 U.S. 83 (1963).61 Id. at 87.
2 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
13 Id. at 586, 305 P.2d at 13. Accord, People v.
Estrada, 54 Cal.2d 713, 716, 7 Cal. Rptr. 897, 899,
355 P.2d 641, 643 (1960); People v. Cartier, 51 Cal.2d
590, 594, 335 P.2d 114, 117 (1959).
"Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 346 P.2d
407 (1959); People v. Cartier, supra note 63; Funk v.
Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959);
right to inspect statements of third parties in the
hands of the prosecution,6 the right to inspect
photographs, 66 scientific and investigatory re-
ports,17 and the names and addresses of witnesses."
Other states appear to be following hesitantly the
trend of the California decisions. 9 In addition
others have enacted legislation enabling the
defendant to more adequately discover the
circumstances and facts of the case against him. °
The movement toward broader disclosure
requirements effected by the courts in criminal
cases has included, to some extent, the prosecution's
right to discovery as well. As noted above the
defense often has a duty to inform the prosecution
of an intended alibi or insanity defense7' to be
raised at trial. In Schmerber v. California72 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that
physical evidence, specifically, a blood sample
Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 92, 330 P.2d 139
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
65 People v. Gamar, 57 Cal.2d 135, 367 P.2d 680,
18 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1961); People v. Estrada, supra note
63; Cash v. Superior Court, supra note 64; but see
People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.2d 755, 349 P.2d 964, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 148 (1960) where the court stated that the de-
fendant must show better cause for discovery "than
a mere desire for the benefit of all information which
has been obtained by the People in their investigation
of the crime." Id. at 770, 349 P.2d at 973, 3 Cal. Rptr.
at 157.66 Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133,
343 P.2d 139 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
67 Brenard v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 2d 314,
341 P.2d 743 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Walker v. Superior
Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (1957);
Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 513,
327 P.2d 68 (1958).
6 People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.2d 223, 32 Cal. Rptr.
424, 384 P.2d 16 (1963); Norton v. Superior Court,
173 Cal. App.2d 133,343 P.2d 139 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
69 See, e.g., State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court,
78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954) (inspection of tangible
physical evidence allowed); State ex rel. Sadler v.
Lackey, 379 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. 1967) (inspection
of FBI report on physical evidence allowed); State v.
Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958) (inspection
of defendant's own statement previously given to
police allowed); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173
N.E.2d 881 (1961) (inspection by defendant of pre-
trial statements of prosecution's witnesses allowed);
State v. White, 15 Ohio St. 2d 146, 239 N.E.2d 65
(1968) (inspection of pre-trial statements of prosecu-
tion's witnesses where court in in camera proceeding
discovered inconsistencies allowed); see also Jones v.
State, 5 Md. App. 180, 245 A.2d 897 (1968); Vermont
v. Mahoney, 122 Vt. 456, 176 A.2d 747 (1961). But
see statutes and cases collected in Moore, Criminal
Discovery, 19 HAST. L.J. 865, 867-8 at n. 18-33 (1968),
which have resisted the trend.
10See e.g., DEL SuP R. CT. (Cams.) Rule 16; FLA.
STATS. § 925.05 (Supp. 1969); IL.. R V. STATs. Ch. 38
§ 114-10; MD. P. R. 728; TENN. ConE ANN. § 40-
2441 (Supp'. 1969); 13 VT. STAT. Am. 6721.
1 See p. 14 supra.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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does not fall within the protective confines of a
person's right against self incrimination"'so long,
apparently, as the method in which it is obtained
does not "shock the conscience" of the court.
74
In Jms v. Superior Court," the Supreme Court
of California again demonstrated its desire to
broaden criminal discovery by upholding a lower
court order requiring that the defendant disclose to
the prosecution the names, addresses and reports
of all medical experts who will offer testimony to
substantiate the defense of impotence in a rape
prosecution.7 6 A broader discussion of the concept
of prosecutorial discovery is presented in the
following section of this article."
, In summary, there has been some expansion of
criminal discovery in recent years, mostly upon
the initiative of the courts. However, most
states still significantly restrict it.7 Moreover, the
reasons offered by opponents of liberal discovery
rules do not appear to be theoretically or practically-
persuasive.7 9
PROSECUTORm DIscovERY
Since debate began on the issue 6f discovery in
criminal cases, one of the strongest sources of
opposition, if not always stated, has been the
assumption that it could not be reciprocal; that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would prevent
the establishment of any rule requiring disclosure
by the defendant.80 Most prosecutors are opposed
to a plan by which they would be required tb
7 Id. at 760
7 4Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). There
the Court excluded evidence obtained by forcing the
defendant to vomit the contents of his stomach which
yielded morphine. Cf. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721 (1969).
75 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919; 96 A.L.R.2d 1213
(1962).
76 Id. at 62, 372 P.2d at 922.
77 See text at p. 14 supra. See also Moore, supra
57 at 809-909; Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-
Incrimination: Roger Traynor Confronts tle Dilemma,
53 Calif. L. Rev. 89(1965).
78 Moore, supra note 40, at 871.
79 See Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal
Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732 (1967). There the author
states that the Vermont statute which allows specifi-
cally the taking of depositions of witnesses before
trial has been highly successful. He points to his survey
which indicates that the right to take depositions has
decreased the likelihood that the case will go to trial.
In addition his survey indicated little difficulty with
the traditional concerns for open discovery: intimida-
tion or 6oerdon of witnesses and greater opportunity
for perjury. Id. at 733-4.
S0 See, e.g., State v. Rhoades, 81 Ohio. St. 397, 424-25,
91 N.E.186, 192 (1910); and United States v. Sermon,
218 F. Supp. 871,872 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
divulge their evidence while receiving no pro-
cedural or evidentiary benefits in return.
Professor Louisell has suggested, however, that
disclosure by the defense is constitutionally
possible and may be enforced in either of two ways.
First, defense disclosure might be obtained by a
change in the order of evidence to require the
defendant to disclose in advance the witnesses
and other evidence which he would produce at the
trial. The alternative procedtre conditions dis-
closure by the prosecution upon voluntary dis-
closures by the defense&
The argument which justifies disclosure by the
defendant upon the power to change the order of
proof takes its reasoning from statutes requiring
the giving of notice of the defenses of alibi and
insanity. Such statutes, their proponents have
argued, do not violate the right against self-
incrimination, but rather
... they set up a wholly reasonable rule of
pleading which in no manner compels a defend-
ant to give any evidence other than that which
he will voluntarily and without compulsion
give at trial. Such statutes do not violate the
right of a defendant to be forever silent. Rather
they say to the accused: If you don't intend to
remain silent, if you expect to offer an alibi
defense, then advance notice and whereabouts
must be forthcoming; but if you personally
and your potential witnesses elect to remain
silent throughout the trial, we have no desire
to break that silence by any requirement of
this statute
2
Following this suggestion by Professor Louisell,
the Supreme Court of California in 1962 innovated
general reciprocal discovery. In Jones v. Superior
Court, the defendant, who was charged with rape,
moved for a continuance of his trial in order that
he might gather medical evidence to show that he
was impotent. The trial court allowed the motion
for continuance, but it also granted a prosecution
motion for disclosure of the names of all physicians
who would testify, the names of all physicians who
81Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or
Apparent?, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 56,87-90 (1961).
82 Dean, Advance Specifr-ations of Defense in Criminal
Cases, 20 A.B.A.J. 435, 440 (1934). Fourteen states
have adopted statutes requiring the defendant to give
notice of his alibi defense. Most of these provide that
the sanction for failure to give such notice shall be
exclusion of the proffered alibi evidence. See 76 Harv.
L. Rev. 838 (1963).
13 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 372 P.2d
919 (1962).
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had treated the defendant, and all documents and
reports of such physicians. The Supreme Court of
California upheld the order as to the names of the
physicians who would testify and all documents
or reports which the defendant would offer into
evidence. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice
Traynor stated: "It simply requires petitioner to
disclose information that he will shortly reveal
anyway. Such information is discoverable." 84
The "advance notice" theory, which justifies
alibi statutes and other pre-trial disclosures by the
defense as a mere change in pleading order, has
been upheld in all states in which alibi statutes
have been questioned.85 The United States Su-
preme Court, however, has never ruled on these
statutes. The Advisory Committee, in its proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, suggested rule 12.1, which would have
required the defendant to give advance notice of
an insanity defense 8  This requirement is common
in many states, 7 and is viewed, like the alibi
statutes, as a change in the order of presenting
evidence. The Supreme Court however declined to
adopt the rule, without stating any reason.
The analysis utilized in justifying the "advance
notice" disclosure is not without constitutional
difficulties. A basic rule of criminal law, now
encased in the Constitution, is that the burden
is on the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty
and that burden is never properly shifted to the
defendant to show his innocence.P With such an
underlying policy, the question of whether and to
what extent the defendant must anticipate the
prosecutor's evidence and disclose his defense
raises practical as well as consitutional problems.
In the situation where a person is charged with a
crime on the basis of dubious eviddnce, it is
difficult to know whether he should show as an
alibi that he was committing another crime
elsewhere, or that he was engaged in an activity
which is in violation of his parole, while not
itself illegal. He may hope that the evidence which
the prosecution presents will be insufficient to
prove a prima facie case or be so weak that a jury
would not convict him in spite of his silence. A
pretrial discovery rule or statute based on the
"advance notice" theory would in fact force him
8 Id. at 62, 372 P.2d at 922.
81 See 76 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 3, at n. 10.
86 34 F.R.D. 411, 418 (1964).
1 Fletcher, Pre-trial Discovery in State Criminal
Cases, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1960).
8 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) incorporating
the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment.
to either incriminate himself or expose himself to
other sanction, possibly needlessly. The un-
certainty regarding the "advance notice" theory
is not confined to the example given. The defendant
may, for other reasons beside surprise, wish to
withhold evidence which may not be needed for his
defense.
It is no practical solution to say that if the
defendant were entitled to disclosure by the
prosecution that he would know what he must
present to establish reasonable doubt. This would
depend upon immeasurable elements of judgment,
such as the impact of testimony and other evidence
at the trial. It would also depend upon how success-
ful cross-examination may be in casting doubt on
the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution-
and no attorney can clearly anticipate this.
Further, defense witnesses are often impeach-
ment witnesses. Whether they are called to
testify largely depends upon the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution. Questions are
certain to arise as to whether the defense should
have anticipated the testimony by the prosecution
witnesses.8 9
The central constitutional question implicit in
the "advance notice" theory, then, is whether the
constitutional right to remain silent also gives the
defendant the right to choose when he may waive
this right, if at all. As noted above, th6 Supreme
Court has never ruled on this issue; however, by
declining to adopt proposed amendment 12.1, the
Court has perhaps suggested that it does.
The second suggested procedure for discovery by
the prosecution is that of voluntary exchange of
information. If a defendant were to request
disclosure of an expert's report, the court might
grant the request upon the condition that the
defendant himself disclose reports of his expert(s).
The choice then becomes a voluntary one for the
defendant, who must weigh the anticipated value
of the information he seeks against the surprise
value or harm of that which he would have to
89Many of these problems, where they occur on
the prasecution side, are recognized in states where the
prosecution is required to give notice of the witnesses
it intends to call. Realizing that the need for witnesses
at the trial is not totally predictable, courts have held
that the listing of such witnesses does not obligate
the prosecution to call all of them, even though the
defense has anticipated their being called. See, e.g.,
People v. Kukulski, 358 Ill. 601, 193 N.E. 504 (1934).
Since impeachment testimony is difficult to anticipate,
most states also exempt impeachment witnesses from
those whom the prosecution must list. See, e.g., Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 114-9(c) (1969).
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disclose. The voluntary exchange theory appears
to be the principal philosophy behind Rule 16(c) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The "voluntary exchange" theory involves
constitutional complexities of its own. An im-
portant initial observation to be made concerning
this theory is that the defendant can not be
required to exchange information for disclosures to
which he is constitutionally entitled under Brady v.
Maryland."
Beyond this, however, the defendant will be
seeking a governmental benefit: information in the
possession of the government. It is by no means
certain that, in order to get this benefit, the
defendant may be required to give up any portion
of the privilege conferred upon him by the Fifth
Amendment.
In Sherbert v. Verner," the Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether the action of South
Carolina officials in denying unemployment
compensation to a member of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church was constitutional. The appel-
[ant was discharged by her employer because her
religion prevented her from working on Saturdays.
She was unable to take other available work for the
3ame reason, but because other work was available,
3tate officials denied her claim for unemployment
-ompensation. The Supreme Court ruled that their
iction was in violation of the First Amendment,
aven though unemployment compensation is only
privilege.
Nor 'may the South Carolina court's
construction of the statute be saved from
constitutional infirmity on the ground that
unemployment compensation benefits are not
appellant's "right" but merely a "privilege."
It is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of condi-
tions upon a benefit or privilege.
9 2
90 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
91 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9id. at 404. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958), the Supreme Court said of a tax statute which
gave a beneficial exemption which indirectly infringed
upon First Amendment privileges that it would "pro-
duce a result which the State could not command
directly," and was therefore unconstitutional. Courts
have also held that loyalty oaths or certificates may
not be imposed as a requisite to the use of public
facilities. Lawson v. Housing Authority of the City
of Milwaukee, 270 Wisc. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955);
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles v. Cor-
dova, 130 Cal. app. 2d883, 279 P.2d.215 (Cal. App.
1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 969 (1956); and Chicago
Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ili.2d 319, 122
A similar rule would seemingly apply where
Fifth Amendment rights are involved. In Griffi; v.
California93 the Supreme Court held that comment
by court and counsel upon the exercise of -this
privilege is unconstitutional. "It is a penalty
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional
privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly." 14
The Supreme Court has taken a similarly
hostile view toward penalties -exacted upon the
exercise of Fifth Amendment rights. In Garrity v.
New Jersey,9' the Court questioned the voluntari-
ness of a statement by a police officer made under
the threat of a New Jersey statute which would
have caused him to lose his job if he were to refuse
to testify. While the Court was thus only con-
cerned with whether or not the statement was
voluntary, the opinion written by Mr. Justice
Douglas made the majority's view of the statute
dear: "There are rights of constitutional stature
whose exercise a State may not condition by the
exactions of a price."'
9 6
These decisions cast doubt on the theory that
the court may negotiate an agreement for the
abandonment of portions of the defendant's right
to remain silent or his right against self-incrimina-
tion in return for the privilege of knowing what
information the state possesses. The defendant, by
exercising his constitutional right, would then fail
to meet the conditions imposed upon the privilege.
To again use the words of Griffin v. California,1 "It
cuts down on the privilege [against self-incrimina-
tion] by making its assertion costly."
DiscovERn AND THE CoNs rurIoN
In recent years debates regarding pre-trial
discovery have included discussions of the extent
N.E.2d 522 (1954) (public financed housing). Danskin
v. San Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal.2d 536, 171
P.2d 885 (1946) (school auditorium).
3 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609- (1965).
"Id. at 614. See also, Steinberg v. United States,
163 F. Supp. 590, 592 (Ct. of Claims 1958), in which
the Court of Claims said,
Notwithstanding the plaintiff had no vested or con-
tractual right to his annuity, we believe that Con-
gress in prescribing a punishment for persons who
exercised a constitutional right has acted beyond
the scope of the Constitution.
9" Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
.G Id. at 500. This view was confirmed in Gardner
v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), in which the Supreme
Court ruled that a police officer could not be consti-
tutionally discharged for exercise of his Fifth Amend-
ment rights. See also, Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967).
97380 U.S., at 614.
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to which the defendant may be entitled to dis-
closure under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. One writer has expressed the
following viewpoint:
Certainly the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment and similar state constitutional
provisions extends to the defendant the right
to a trial and implies the right to a fair trial.
It is apparent that a defendant cannot have a
fair trial unless he is given the opportunity to
ascertain the facts. In a criminal case not
only must the defendant be given an oppor-
tunity to present evidence, but he also has to
know the claims of the prosecution so that he
will be in a position to meet such claims. If
the evidence in the hands of the prosecution is
not made available to the accused, certainly
he will not be given an opportunity to
adequately and fairly defend himself.'
The Supreme Court has not accepted this
argument. In Leland v. Oregon99 the court ruled
that the trial court's refusal to order the prosecu-
tion to permit the defendant's attorney to examine
the defendant's confession before trial was not a
deprivation of due process. The Court did note,
however, that it might have been the better
practice to have allowed the examination.
In Cicenia v. Lagay in 1958100 the Court re-
affirmed Leland, which, it said, had ruled "that
in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the
defendant it was not a violation of due process
for a State to deny counsel an opportunity before
trial to inspect his client's confession." '  The
Court then went on to say, "we cannot say that
the discretionary refusal of the trial judge to
permit inspection in this case offended the Four-
teenth Amendment.' °0 Since permitting the
9 Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 Am.
CRIm. L.Q. 3, 12 (1962). See also State v. Dorsey, 207
La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945); Goldstein, The State and
the Accused: Balance of Advantages in Criminal Pro-
cedure, 69 YAIa L.J. 1149, 1173-99 (1960); Note,
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Hagv. L. Rxv.
940, 1051-63 (1961); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecu-
tion: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASU.
U.L.Q. 279.
09 343 U.S. 790, 801-02 (1952). The prosecutor had,
however, permitted defense counsel to examine the
confession during trial and five days before the defense
rested.
100 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
01 Id. at 511.
1
02 Id. The primary question in Cicenia, however,
was whether the refusal of the police to permit the
defendant to see his retained counsel, who in turn was
demanding to see him, was a violation of due process.
The change in the Court's view as indicated in Esco-
defendant or his attorney to examine the defend-
ant's own confession probably is the least objec-
tionable type of discovery,10' these cases appear
to negate the argument that due process guaran-
tees the defendant an opportunity to prepare his
defense with knowledge of the claims of the prose-
cution, at least in the absence of a showing of
actual prejudice.
But when the prosecution has concealed infor-
mation which might be helpful to the defense, the
Court's reaction has been considerably different.
This fact is revealed by a review of the Court's
decisions in this area over the past forty years.
Mooney v. Holohan,'4 a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding in 1935, involved a claim that the state
prosecutor had knowingly permitted a prosecution
witness to perjure himself without any attempt by
the prosecutor to correct the testimony or reveal
sources of impeachment to the defense. The
Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires "fundamental conceptions of
justice."
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to
be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a
State has contrived a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as
a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of court and
jury by the presentation of testimony known
to be perjured .... 105
The Mooney decision was concerned only with
the prosecution's use of false evidence. In the 1942
case of Pyle v. Kansas,100 however, the Court
expanded its language.
Petitioner's papers are inexpertly drawn, but
they do set forth allegations that his imprison-
ment resulted from perjured testimony, know-
ingly used by the state authorities to obtain
his conviction, and from the deliberate sup-
pression by those same authorities of evidence
favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently
charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution, and, if proven,
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), may indicate a
change in this question.
103 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855
(1966); United States v. Nolte, 39 F.R.D. 359 (N.D.
Cal. 1965); United States v. Williams, 37 F.R.D. 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Willis, 33 F.R.D.
510 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133,
145 A.2d.313 (1958).
1-4 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
106 Id. at 112.
106 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
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would entitle petitioner to release from his
present custody.'7
Thus the Court brought under its Mooney rule
prohibiting the concealment of perjured testi-
mony, the deliberate suppression by the prosecu-
tion of evidence favorable to the defense."' The
meaning of the Court's concept of "suppression"
was not obvious from either the Court's opinion
or from its recitation of the facts in Pyle.
In the lower courts, the prosecutor's duty to
disclose evidence favorable to the defendant came
to be defined as a duty of disclosure if the evidence
is of a type or from a source which in all probability
would make it very persuasive to a fair minded
jury even though the prosecutor does not believe
the testimony 9 Under this definition the prose-
cutor was required to disclose the names of eye-
witnesses who did not identify the defendant as
being at the scene of the crime, even though other
eyewitnesses did identify him.W0 Courts of Appeal
also have ruled that the prosecution is obligated to
disclose favorable, even though questionable and
disputed, evidence involving such matters of judg-
ment as whether the defendant was iitoxicated at
the time of an alleged murder,"1 or whether the
defendant was insane when his own expert has
judged him not to be."'
Fifteen years after Pyle, in Alcorta v. Texas,"
the testimony involved was not perjured but was
possibly incomplete. The defendant, charged with
murdering his wife, was attempting to show thai
the case fell within the Texas murder-without-
malice rule. He testified that he suspected his wife
of being unfaithful to him and that when he found
her kissing her paramour, he killed her. Before the
10 Id. at 215-16.
"8See also Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960),
in which the Supreme Court remanded the case for
hearing in the state courts when the defendant alleged
that the prosecution had "willfully suppressed the testi-
mony of two eye witnesses to the alleged crime which
would have exonerated the petitioner." The Court,
in a per curiam decision, held that it would find no
no justification for the state court's refusal to hear
the claims.
09 United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221
F.2d 763, 769 (3d Cir.) (Concurring opinion of Judge
Hastie) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
110 United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d
135 (2d Cir. 1964); Application of Kapatos, 208 F.
Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). "
1221 F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1955).
12Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963). The Court here ruled that
the prosecution should have disclosed to the defense
that two of the four prosecution experts believed the
defendant to be legally insane.
" 355 U.S. 28 (1957):
trial, the paramour admitted to the prosecutor
that he had had intercourse with the victim several
times. The prosecutor told him not to volunteer
any information about the intercourse, but that,
if specifically asked about it, he should answer
truthfully. At the trial the paramour testified that
on the night of the killing he had not kissed the
victim, that he had only brought her home from
work, that they had never kissed or talked of love,
and that they had never had'a "date." While
nothing indicated that any testimony regarding
the night of the killing was false, the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction.
If Castilleja's relationship with petitioner's
wife had been truthfully portrayed to the jury,
it would have, apart from impeaching his
credibility, tended to corroborate petitioner's
contention that he had found his wife embrac-
ing Castilleja."
In Alcorta, the Supreme Court seemed to extend
the Mooney rule. It seemed to say that besides not
being allowed to present perjured testimony, the
prosecution may not construct an erroneous and
misleading impression through narrowly truthful
testimony."1 Second, the decision indicates that
the prosecution is constitutionally prohibited from
suppressing evidence which only inferentially
supports the defendant's cause as well as evidence
which would directly support his defense.
Beyond these two additions to the Moomey rule,
the Supreme Court in Alcorta intimated that the
use of untrue or misleading evidence would be
grounds for reversal of a conviction though the
evidence only goes to credibility. Two years later,
in'Napue v. Illinois,"16 the court affirmed this rule.
In Napue a co-defendant, testifying on behalf of
the State, said that he was not promised any
reward by the State in return for his testimony.
1
4 Id. at 31-32.
"1 See also Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th
Cir. 1964), in which the court ruled that where prosecu-
tion witnesses identified the defendant's gun as looking
like the one they saw, it was obligated to disclose
laboratory evidence tending to show that it was not
the gun used, even though the prosecution did not
offer the gun itself into evidence. The court said that
the presence of the gun caused an inference that it
was the one, even though not introduced into evidence.
In United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d
815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953),
the court ruled that the prosecution had denied a
defendant due process where it allowed an inference
that the defendant killed a victim of a robbery to stand
when the evidence in its possession tended to show
that a police bullet actually caused the death.
U 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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In fact, the state's attorney had told the witness,
who was then serving a prison term, that he would
"do what he could" for the prisoner. The Supreme
Court ruled that the Mooney decision "does not
cease to apply merely because the false testimony
goes only to the credibility of the witness."- 7
Napue v. Illinois expressed a logical extension of
the rule in Mooney. Even where the prosecutor does
not solicit false testimony or produce a witness
who he knows will perjure himself, if he neverthe-
less allows false testimony to go uncorrected, the
defendant's constitutional rights are violated"
Meanwhile, in federal prosecutions the Supreme
Court was showing a similar hostility toward the
prosecutorial practice of not revealing facts tending
to show perjury or lack of credibility of govern-
ment witnesses. In Mesarosh v. United States,' 9 the
Solicitor General disclosed to the Court that he
had learned that the only witness who had in-
criminated the defendant had perjured himself in
other cases. The Court reversed the defendant's
conviction. "The dignity of the United States
Government will not permit the conviction of any
person on tainted testimony. This conviction is
tainted, and there can be no other just result than
to accord petitioners a new trial.
120
Since constitutional authority was not used by
the Court in Mesarosh, the decision probably
rested upon the Court's supervisory power."' This
conclusion is supported by the Court's primary
reliance upon Communist Party v. Control Board,1"
which involved a dear instance of perjury by a
government witness. The Court reversed that
conviction, relying upon its supervisory powers.
Perhaps the most significant Supreme Court
pronouncement in the area of disclosure and due
process is Brady v. Maryland, decided in 1963.2'
Brady and Boblit were charged with a first degree
murder which occurred in the course of a robbery.
During the trial Brady's attorney requested that
the prosecutor give him copies of statements made
by Boblit. The prosecutor gave the attorney copies
of all of Boblit's statements except one in which
Boblit admitted that he did the killing. There was
no indication whether the omission was intentional
1 Id. at 269. See also Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d
275 (5th Cir. 1961).
"ISee also United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d
782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965).
119 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
1
0 Id. at 9.
M See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
"'351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956).
1n 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
or whether it was merely an oversight. In his final
argument, Brady's attorney admitted that Brady
was guilty of first degree murder, but he urged the
jury to sentence the defendant to life in prison,
rather than death. The Maryland Court of Appeals
ruled that the suppression of the statement was a
denial of due process to the defendant and ordered
a new trial limited to the question of punishment,
but not the issue of guilt or innocence."M
Before the United States Supreme Court, the
state did not oppose the order of a new trial on the
issue of punishment. The only issue was whether
there should also have been a new trial on the issue
of guilt or innocence. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Douglas, affirmed the
Maryland Court of Appeals, ruling that, while in
Maryland the jury is the judge of law as well as
fact, the court must judge the admissibility of
evidence. The admission to the killing by the co-
defendant would not be admissible on the issue of
guilt under the felony-murder rule, although it
would be admissible on the issue of punishment,
which in this case was also a question for the jury.2 5
Although it upheld the Maryland ruling, the
Supreme Court took the opportunity to make a
broad statement regarding the suppression of
evidence. After reviewing Mooney v. Holohan"1 6 and
the cases following it, the Court said
We now hold that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution .... Society wins
not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair.... A prosecution
that withholds evidence on demand of an
accused which, if made available would tend to
exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps
shape a trial that bears heavily on a defendant.
That casts the prosecutor in a role of an archi-
tect of a proceeding that - does not comport
with standards of justice, even though, as in
"2 Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961).
121 In this regard, the Court was, of course, dis-
cussing only Maryland law. In other states the rule
might be different. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953), which involved a similar
problem. In that case the Third Circuit- reviewed the
question in light of Pennsylvania law and ruled that,
under such circumstances, the defendant should receive
a new trial, since the evidence would have been admis-
sible aside from the issue of punishment.
126 294 U.S. 103.
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the present case, his action is not "the result
of guile"... 27
The implications involving discovery contained
in this decision were noted by Justice White in a
concurring opinion:
I would employ more confining language and
would not cast in constitutional form a broad
rule of criminal discovery. Instead, I would
leave this task, at least for now, to the rule-
making or legislative process after full con-
sideration by legislators, bench, and bar.128
In Brady the Court answered several unresolved
questions. It ruled that an unintentional failure to
disclose favorable evidence to the defense would in
itself amount to a denial of due process.l It also
went beyond the doctrine of Mooney v. Holohan.
By reaffirming the duty of the prosecution to
disclose evidence material to punishment, the
Court appeared to be moving away from the
common law view of the adversary process. Basing
its reasoning upon the duty of the state to see that
justice is done, rather than merely to convict, the
Court appears to require that any steps toward
assuring that end be taken.
To recapitulate, the Court started with the rule
that the prosecution may not seek convictions
through evidence which it knows to be misleading.
Later a rule evolved that required the prosecution
to disclose evidence which, within its judgment,
would benefit the defendant with respect to the
issue of guilt or innocence. Now the rule probably
requires that the prosecutor disclose evidence
favorable to the defendant for purposes beyond the
mere issue of guilt or innocence. Would it be a
long or illogical step to say that such a general
purpose, lying beyond the issue of guilt or inno-
cence, might include the preparation to meet the
charges of the prosecution?
Furthermore, the judgment of what might
benefit the defendant is no longer solely within the
discretion of the prosecuting attorney. As the rule
now stands, the .prosecution probably has an
absolute duty to disclose to the defendant any-
thing which, in the court's view, may be of benefit
to him for the prescribed purposes. The criterion
is not the belief of the prosecator that the informa-
W373 U.S. at 87-88.
mId. at 92.
129 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Helwig v. Maroney,
271 F.2d 329 (3rd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
954 (1960); Gay v. Graham, 269 F.2d 482 (10th Cir.
1959).
tion would be helpful, or even his knowledge that
certain information exists, but rather (1) whether
the state has information and (2) whether such
information might be material.
To avoid reversals for nondisclosure, prosecutors
will probably submit evidence raising a disclosure
issue to courts for in camera inspection and deter-
mination 30 This could create a considerable
burden for state trial judges and bring into clearer
focus the problem discussed by the Court in Jencks
v. United Statesl There the Court noted that the
obligation to review the prosecution's evidence for
material favorable to the defendant for purposes of
impeachment or determination of guilt or punish-
ment may be burdensome to already busy judges
and that courts could not be expected to recognize
as would the advocate what items might be
favorable.
1 2
As previously indicated Brady v. Maryland
contains language which may require that the
prosecution make the required disclosures only
"upon request" or "on demand." This implies that,
where no demand is made by the defendant or his
attorney, the prosecution is not obligated to dis-
close material evidence. When this issue was
raised in Barbee v. Warde1 3  the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit ruled that "[i]n gauging the
nondisclosure in terms of due process, the focus
must be on the essential fairness of the procedure
and not on the astuteness of either counsel." The
court held that failure of defense counsel to demand
information did not deny the defendant a right to
receive it. TM
n0 See United States ex rel. Bund v. LaVallee, 344
F.2d 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 867 (1965),
in which, in response to demand for the grand jury
testimony of a witness, the prosecutor submitted
the transcript for in camera inspection by the court
to determine that no contradictions in the testimony
of the witness existed. This was a New York state
proceeding.
1 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
mIn Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
183-84 (1969), the Court noted that
[a]dversary proceedings will not magically elim-
inate all error, but they will substantially reduce
its incidence by guarding against the possibility
that the trial judge, through lack of time or un-
familiarity with the information contained in and
suggested by the materials, will be unable to pro-
vide the scrutiny which the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule demands.
Bfit in Taglianetti v. Unites States, 394 U.S. 316 (1969),
it held that resort to adversary proceedings was neces-
sary oily when in camera proceedings were inadequate
to protect the defendant's rights with regard to elec-
tronic surveillance.
m 331 F.2d at 846.
lmSee also United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins,
19701
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The Supreme Court has not elaborated upon the
ramifications of its decision in Brady v. Maryland.
Since 1963 it has avoided making pronouncements
defining the limits of the duty to disclose. In Giles
v. Maryland,3 5 however, the Court was forced to
great lengths to avoid the Brady doctrine. Giles
involved a 1961 rape charge in which Giles and two
others were convicted and sentenced to death. 3 6
The alleged victim, a sixteen year-old girl, had a
history of juvenile charges, emotional illness, and
promiscuous behavior. The asserted defense was
consent. At the trial the prosecution did not dis-
close the girl's background, or the fact that after
this alleged crime she accused two other men of
raping her on another occasion and that she had
attempted suicide.
The case presented the question of whether the
prosecution was required to disclose evidence
relative to the victim's credibility. The Court,
however, could not agree upon the answer to the
question. Rather the "plurality".'1 took an unusual
step. At the time of the oral arguments, the Court
requested copies of police reports which were not a
part of the lower court's record. Examining these
reports, the Justices discovered several discrepan-
cies between the reports and the testimony of the
police officers and the alleged victim at the trial.
On the basis of these discrepancies, they decided
to remand the case to the Maryland courts with
directions to determine whether or not the prosecu-
tion had allowed misleading evidence to stand
uncorrected l3 Thus, the plurality avoided the
issue of prosecutorial suppression by remanding
under the rule of Napue v. Illinois."5
Justices White and Fortas wrote concurring
opinions. Justice White recognized that the case
raised the issue of the suppression of evidence but
avoided interpretation of Brady'40 by ordering
remand based upon his view that the suppression
possibly violated Maryland Rules of Procedure,
326 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1964), where the court
ruled that "the case before us differs from Brady in
that the defense counsel here never requested the
disclosure of evidence from the prosecution, but we
think such a request is not a sine qua non to establish
a duty on the prosecution's part." See also the con-
curring opinion of Justice Fortas in Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66 (1967).
5 386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967).
"6 The Governor, however, commuted the sentence
to life imprisonment.
w 386 U.S. at 102.
w 386 U.S. at 74.
13 360 U.S. at 269.
140 386 U.S. at 102.
Rule 92241 Justice Fortas was the sole member of
the majority to reach the Brady question. He felt
that is was unacceptable for the prosecution to
suppress information solely because it might not
be admissible at trial.16 He conceded that repetiti-
ous information may be suppressed"' but empha-
sized that suppression as well as misrepresentation
falls under the Brady rule:
I see no reason to make the result turn on
the adventitious circumstance of a request. If
the defense does not know of the existence of
the evidence, it may not be able to request its
production.'"
Justice Harlan, with Justices Black, Clark and
Stewart joining, responded specifically to Fortas'
interpretation of Brady. Mr. Justice Harlan
accused Fortas of relying on dictum from Brady'
to unduly extend Napue. Mr. Justice Harlan
emphasized that this extension was not only with-
out support in the Brady holding but was also
specifically rejected by Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,146 which specifically
limits discovery to "avoid abuses"14Z Thus, after
Giles v. Maryland the meaning of Brady v. Mary-
land is uncertain.
In McCray v. Illinois'4" the Supreme Court ruled
that the Constitution does not require that the
prosecution disclose the name of an informer. The
full implication of this decision to a discussion of
criminal discovery is uncertain, however. The
majority opinion distinguished McCray, where
identity of the informer was important only to the
issue of probable cause for arrest and search, from
cases where the demanded disclosure relates to the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.
Another important limitation upon the line of
cases which has been traced is that they do not
require pre-trial discovery. Thus the Brady deci-
sion must be understood to refer to the application
,4 Id. at 94.
112 Id. at 98. In Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969), the Supreme Court ruled that the
prosecution was obliged to disclose to the defense
records of electronic surveillance which might have
led to the uncovering of evidence. The prosecution,
however, conceded the obligation and the only dispute
was as to the manner by which disclosure was to be
made. The Court did not discuss or cite the Brady
decision.
143 386 U.S. at 98.
4 Id. at 102.
15 Id. at 116.
141Id. at 117.
147 Id. at- 118. United States v. Manhattan Brush
Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'"386 U.S. 300 (1967).
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of tests of fairness to the prosecution at trial and
not at an earlier point in the proceedings9 It is
true that Brady and the Supreme Court cases
antedating it were limited to disclosures at any
time before the end of the trial. Thus in Leland v.
Oregon,150 the Court appeared to place emphasis
upon the fact that the defendant had an opportu-
nity to see his own statement before he had rested
his case, even though he had no opportunity before
the trial.
On the other hand, it would be too simple to say
that the reasoning behind Brady and its com-
panion cases is limited to disclosure at the trial.
A logical argument may be made for the need of
fuller disclosure for preparation of the defense, a
need which cannot be met by sudden disclosure
during the heat of trial. Furthermore, knowledge
by the defendant of information favorable to him
will affect not only trial strategy, but also the
decision to enter a plea of guilty. This latter
problem arose in a case before-the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania.ln
Early in 1947, one Hough, together with two
others-Smith and Almeida-robbed a grocery
store. Hough, the defendant in this case, went into
the store with Almeida while Smith waited in the
car. While in the store, Almeida fired the pistol
that he was carrying. The defendant did not fire
his pistol. As Hough and Almeida left the store, an
off-duty police officer stopped beside the car of the
robbers. Other police officers arrived at the scene,
and an off duty police officer was killed in an ex-
change of gun fire. Hough, Almeida and Smith
left the scene of the robbery; but Hough fell out of
the escaping car and was arrested. The other two
were not captured for over a year. When Hough
was arrested, he was carrying a .45 pistol.
On the advice of counsel Hough decided to plead
guilty to first degree murder, thereby hoping to
avoid the death penalty. Although his plea was
accepted, Hough was nevertheless sentenced to
death. After Almeida had also been arrested, tried,
and sentenced to death, and while the trial of
Smith was in progress, it was learned that the
prosecution had evidence which showed that the
off-duty police officer had been killed by a .38 bul-
let. Hough had been carrying a .45 pistol when
arrested; and the bullet dug out of a wall in the
149 United States ex rel. Hough v. Maroney, 247 F.
Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
150 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
15247 F. Supp. 767.
store, admittedly fired by Almeida, showed that
he also was carrying a .45. Smith was carrying a
.22 pistol; and witnesses agreed that at the time
of the killing he was operating the automobile and
could not have fired the weapon. This evidence
tended to show that a police bullet had actually
caused the death. None of this was disclosed to
Hough or his attorney before Hough entered his
plea of guilty. Neither was it revealed at the trial
of Almeida. In an habeas corpus proceeding, the
United States District Court reversed Almeida's
conviction.lu It ruled that the suppression in
Hough's case amounted to a deprivation of due
process. Further, the court ruled that the reversal
was not to be avoided through any distinction
between a plea of guilty and a verdict. It considered
"Hough's plea of guilty as a conviction, for the
entering of a plea of guilty by a defendant to
charges as contained in an indictment is in itself a
conviction." 1- The court then said that false or
suppressed evidence can neither convict nor
condemnu' 4
The problem indicated by the Hough case is
obvious. When a defendant enters a plea of guilty
before trial, the prosecution need not present its
evidence. Must it, however, present evidence which
may be beneficial to the defendant before the court
accepts the plea? The United States Supreme
Court has not made a definitive statement regard-
ing the duty of the prosecution to make disclosure
before a plea of guilty is entered. However, in the
1960 case of Wilde v. Wyoming55 the defendant
alleged that his plea of guilty to murder had been
induced by lack of counsel and by the fact that the
prosecution had "wilfully suppressed the testimony
of two eye-witnesses to the alleged crime which
would have exonerated the petitioner."1 ' The
Court, in remanding the case for further hearings,
ruled that there was nothing "to justify the denial
of hearing on the allegations." The import of this
decision is that there apparently is some duty to
disclose, even where there is to be no trial because
of a forthcoming plea of guilty.
12 United States ex rel. Alneida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d
815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
The total reversal of convictions in the cases of Almeida
and Hough distinguishes these from the otherwise
similar case of Brady, in which only the sentence was
set aside. The different results, however, are apparently
due to differences in state law and procedure, not to
different constitutional interpretations.
1 247 F. Supp. at 778.
'5 Id. at 779.
155 362 U.S. 607.
25 Id.
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The problems created by the constitutional
decisions requiring disclosure may be extensive in
many states. Following, as many still do, a strict
common law view of the adversary process, the
states have no efficient machinery for implement-
ing the constitutional mandates of the Supreme
Court. The prosecution, while under an obligation
to disclose certain information, has no method for
formally disclosing it. Neither side has a recognized
procedure for determining which items should or
should not be divulged. The result is that, perhaps
years later, the defendant may learn that the prose-
cution had certain information, which the defend-
ant contends should have been revealed, and will
initiate a collateral attack on the conviction.
A second problem created by these decisions is
one of timing. It would seem obvious that a re-
quirement of disclosure means effective disclosure.
To be effective the information must be disclosed
at a time when its import may be examined and
weighed by the trier and the adversary. A dis-
closure at the end of a trial of an important but
detailed document would not allow the defendant
an opportunity to immediately develop the signifi-
cance of the evidence, if indeed he even has an
opportunity to place it in the proper perspective.
To demonstrate this a hypothetical problem may
be constructed from the facts in the Hough case.15
If, at the time of the arraignment and immediately
before the defendant entered his plea of guilty, the
prosecutor were to disclose that the victim had
been killed by a .38 bullet and that a .45 bullet was
found in the wall of the grocery store being robbed,
this would probably not indicate much to either
the attorney or his client. Neither knew the caliber
of Almeida's pistol and Hough assumed that
Almeida had fired the fatal shot. The bft-recog-
nized right to notice would seem reasonably to
apply here.'u Requiring some notice, whether it be
strictly "pre-trial" or not, would not be a radical
or illogical step.
DIscoVERY IN THE FEDERAL RULEs OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Federal courts have not been in the vanguard of
the movement to liberalize criminal discovery.159
167 247 F. Supp. 767.
1-' See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
1"9 Several states by decision or statute have more
liberal criminal discovery rules. See, e.g., State v.
McGhee, 91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261 (1962); State v.
Superior Court, 90 Ariz. 133, 367 P.2d 6 (1961);
This reluctance to innovate may be traceable to the
opposition to criminal discovery voiced by such
respected jurists as Learned Hand160 and Benjamin
Cardozo6m Perhaps it is due to a natural reluctance
to embark upon a venture which is dearly incon-
sistent with the traditional adversary concept of
criminal trials. Whatever the reason, clear traces of
a broadening federal criminal discovery have been
discernible only within the last decade.
The original codification of federal criminal
procedure in the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure appeared to allow the trial court some measure
of discretion in ordering discovery. However, these
Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d
919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962); People v. Cooper, 53
Cal. 2d 755, 770, 349 P.2d 964, 973 3 Cal. Rptr. 148,
157, (1960); People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 335 P.2d
114 (1959); State v. Minor, 177 A.2d 215 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1962); People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619,97 N.W.2d
739 (1959); People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204
N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960); FLA. STAT. §
225.04 (Supp. 1969); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-9.
160 See, United States v. Violon, 173 F. 501, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 1909), where Judge Hand said in dis-
cussing a motion to inspect grand jury minutes,
I cannot satisfactorily speculate upon the evidence
which must have been before the grand jury nor
will I either myself inspect or permit another to
inspect its minutes;
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923), where Judge Hand denied a defendant access to
a grand jury's minutes by saying that
[No judge of this court had granted it, and I hope
none ever will. Under our criminal procedure the
accused has every advantage. While the prosecu-
tion is held rigidly to the charge, he need not dis-
close the barest outline of his defense. He is
immune from question or comment on his silence,
he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair
doubt in the minds of any of the twelve. Why in
addition he should in advance have the whole evi-
dence against him to pick over at his leisure, and
make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never
been able to see;
United States v. Dilliard, 101 F.2d 829, 837, where
Judge Hand said,
The defendants seem to suppose that they had
the privilege of roaming about at will among any
memoranda made by the prosecution in prepara-
tion for trial: that indeed is not an uncommon il-
lusion, but it has nothing whatever to support it.
161 See, People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of
New York, 245 N.Y. 24, 32-33, 156 N.E. 84, 86-87
(1927), where Cardozo, C.J., traced the history of
resistance to discovery in criminal trial and found that
while the
... glimmerings of such a doctrine are to be found,
as we have seen in courts other than our own...
[and indeed allowance of such discovery may be
the proper course for the future, nonetheless, under
the present state of the law] ... the defendant, ...
fails to make out her title to the remedy [of dis-
covery].
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rules were narrowly construed. Rule 7(f),16 which
permitted the court to order the prosecttion to
serve a bill of particulars, was interpreted as a
restatement of common law powersiln Thus,
attempts to use Rule 7(f) to obtain evidence were
rejected,1 6 as were attempts to use the rule to
obtain the names of witnesses.1 65
The original rule of criminal procedure which
came closest to allowing some form of discovery
was Rule 16. This rule reads in part:
Upon motion of a defendant at any time
after the filing of the indictment or informa-
tion, the court may order the attorney for the
government to permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph designated books,
papers, documents or tangible objects, ob-
tained from or belonging to the defendant or
obtained from others by seizure or by process,
upon a showing that the items sought may be
material to the preparation of his defense and
that the request is reasonable... 166
162 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f) (old):
The court for cause may direct the filing of a bill
of particulars. Motion for a bill of particulars may
be made only within ten days after arraignment or
at such other time before or after arraignment as
may be prescribed by rule or order. A bill of par-
ticulars may be amended at any time subject to
such conditions as justice requires....
as amended, Feb. 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966,
Rule 7(f) now reads:
The court may direct the filing of a bill of particu-
lars. A motion for a bill of particulars may be made
before arraignment or within ter days after ar-
raignment or at such later time as the court may
permit. A bill of particulars may be amended at
any time subject to such conditions as justice re-
quires.
See generally Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 59 IV. VA. L. REv. 221 (1957).
in3 See Longsdorf, The Beginnings and Background of
Federal Criminal Procedure, 4 W. BARRON, FEDERAL
PnAcrcE AND PaocEDuRE 1, 32 (1951), in which the
common law authority was traced to Rex v. Hodgson,
2 C. & P. 422, 172 Eng. Rep. 484 (1828).
'64 See, e.g., Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77,
82 (1927); Frederick v. United States, 163 F.2d 536,
545-46 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 775
(1947), wherein is cited a list of cases holding that
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the
failure of the court to allow a bill of particulars would
not be disturbed on appeal.
165 United States v. Elliot, 266 F. Supp. 318, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Tucker, 262 F.
Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v.
Bennett, 36 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.S.C. 1964), cert.
denied, '385 U.S. 1005; United States v. Lebron, 222
F.2d 531, 535-6 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
876; United States v. Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
1 6 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (old).
This rule, as adopted, was more restrictive than the
original draft of Rule 16, which authorized -the
trial court to order disclosure of any document or
object not privileged upon a showing of materiality
and reasonableness01 7 As interpreted by the courts,
Rule 16 was confined to its explicit language.
Courts held that the rule did not entitle the defend-
ant to examine his own confession,11 that of a
co-defendant,6 9 investigative reports,70 or grand
jury minutes.'
Finally, Rule 17(c) offered some apparent prom-
ise as an instrument of discovery.'7' This'rle
authorized a trial court to order advance produc-
167The preliminary draft of the original Rule 16
(then Rule 19) is quoted at BARRON, supra note 163,
at 124:
Discovery and Inspection. Upon motion of the
defendant at any time after the filing of the indict-
ment or information and after the defendant has
been taken into custody the court may order the
attorney for the government to permit the inspec-
tion and copying or photographing, by or on behalf
of the moving party, of any designated books,
papers, documents, or tangible objects, not privi-
leged, upon a showing that the items sought may
be material to the preparation of the defense and
that the request is reasonable.
'"3United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 820
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962); Schaffer v.
United States, 221 F.2d 17, 19-20 (5th Cir. 1955);
Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 843-45 (8th
Cir. 1949). Contra United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D.
423, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
169 E.g. United States v. Buemfield, 85 F. Supp. 696,
707-08 (W.D. La. 1949); United States v. Carter, 15
F.R.D. 367, 370-71 (D.C. 1954).
170 United States v. Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. 485,
498 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Tirado, 25
F.R.D. 270, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v.
Fuentes, 25 F.R.D. 278, 279-(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
17 In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,
360 U.S. 395, 397 (1959), the Court held that the trial
court's refusal to make grand jury minutes available
to the defendant was not error absent a showing of
"particularized need." The Court did not specifically
refer to Rule 16, but said that "any disclosure of
grand jury minutes is covered by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 6...." It can be inferred that
since Rule 6 did not allow discovery, Rule 16 certainly
would not allow it either.17 
FE. R. Cpma. P. 17(c):
For Production of Documentary Evidence and of
Objects, a subpoena may also command the person
to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers,
documents or other objects designated therein. The
court on motion made promptly may quash or
modify the subpoena if compliance would be un-
reasonable or oppressive. The court may direct
that books, papers, documents, or objects desig-
"nated in the subpoena be produced before the court
at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when
they are to be offered in evidence and may upon
their production permit the books, papers, doc-
uments, or objects or portions thereof to be in-
spected by the parties and their attornevs.
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tion of subpoenaed evidence to allow counsel an
opportunity to inspect it. Courts, however, ruled
that this was designed to avoid delay at the trial
and was not to be used as a discovery tool. 73
Documents which were subject to subpoena or
at-trial production were not also subject to inspec-
tion as a matter of right
74
Although the original Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure did not provide for broad or effective
discovery, the Supreme Court in the 1950's devel-
oped a type of limited trial discovery. In 1953 in
Gordon v. United States7 the Court ruled that a
criminal defendant is entitled to production of a
witness's prior inconsistent statements where the
contradictions concern relevant and important
matters and where the demand is for production of
specific documents and is not merely a fishing
expedition. Several years later in the widely
publicized Jencks171 case the Court dealt more
specifically with the problems raised by the demand
for production of inconsistent statements. In
Jencks the defendant moved to be allowed to
examine reports made by two witnesses, under-
'7, Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
214, 220 (1951), held that "Rule 17 (c) was not in-
tended to provide an additional means of discovery."
Rather, it was intended ".... to expedite the trial by
providing a time and place before trial for the inspec-
tion of the subpoenaed materials." United States v.
Marchisio, 344, F.2d 653, 669 (2d Cir. 1965), held that,
"[u]nlike the rule in civil actions, a subpoena duces
tecum in a criminal action is not intended for the
purpose of discovery...."
174 See United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), where the court rejected the de-
fendant's interpretation of Bowman Dairy Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 214 to the effect that it allowed
all documents which are subject to subpoena under
Rule 17(c) to also be subject to inspection by the
defendant as a matter of right. The court in Iozia
stated that it did not so construe the authority. It
emnihasized that any inspection by the defendant under
Rule 17(c) was not a matter of right but rather wholly
discretionary with the court.
17 344 U.S. 414, 418-19 (1953), held that where
statements made by a witness
"... were contradictory of his present testimony,
and that the contradiction was as to relevant,
important and material matters... [and]... [t]he
demand was for production of these specific docu-
ments and did not propose any broad or blind
fishing expeditions among documents ... on the
chance that something impeaching might turn
up... we think... that an accused is entitled to
the production of such documents.
276Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
Jencks became a national cause c6Tlbre because it
involved reversal of a conviction for signing a false non-
communist affidavit. The decision forced the govern-
ment to choose between producing the demanded
documents and possibly divulging state secrets and
dismissing the indictment.
cover agents for the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, who had testified against him. The Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court should have
allowed the defendant to examine the reports
because the reports, made contemporaneously
with the occurrences to which the witnesses later
testified at trial, were reliable instruments with
which to check the truthfulness of the witnesses'
testimony at the trial. Furthermore, the Court
stated that the documents must be made available
to the defense for only the defense could adequately
determine which statements were effective in
discrediting the witnessj'7 Thus, the practice
which had developed in several courts,"7 of the
prosecution's delivering the statements to the trial
court for in camera inspection to determine if there
were contradictions, was found to lack the neces-
sary sensitivity.
Jencks was not ostensibly based on constitu-
tional grounds but rather on the Court's super-
visory powers 79 The Congress, accordingly, was
not barred from exercising its Article III powers
and passed the Jencks Act'80 in order to limit the
unwanted effect of the decision. This provided, in
summary, that (a) in Federal criminal prosecu-
tions, no statement or report given to an United
States agent by one other than the defendant shall
by subject to discovery or inspection until after
the witness who gave the statement has 'testified;
(b) after the witness' testimony on direct examina-
tion, the court shall, on motion of the defendant,
order the prosecution to produce statements made
by the witness relating to the subject matter to
which he has testified; (c) if the prosecution claims
that any statement ordered to be produced con-
tains matters not relating to the subject matter of
the witness' testimony, the court is to examine that
matter, in camera, and to excise portions which do
not relate to the testimony of the witness, before
delivering the statements to the defendant; (d) the
United States may elect not to comply with the
order to produce such statement, in which case the
court shall order the testimony of the witness
177 353 U.S. at 668-9.
178 See, e.g., United States v. Beeckman, 155 F.2d
580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946), United States v. Eheling, 146
F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Cohen,
145 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
799.
""In Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 258
(1961), the Court stated that ". . . the procedure re-
quired by the decision of this Court in Jencks was not
required by'the Constitution... ;" Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n. 11 (1959).
180 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964).
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stricken or declare mistrial; and (e) statements or
reports as covered by the act are defined as written
statements made and signed, or otherwise adopted
or approved, by the witness, and recordings and
' transcriptions of recordings which are substantially
verbatim recitals of oral statements and recorded
contemporaneously with the making of them.
Despite the uproar created by Jencks v. United
Sates, the Congress' reaction in the Jencks Act was
mild. No attempt was made to bar production of
all documents, rather the act re-established the
procedure of in camera inspection by the trial
court. However, under the act the trial court was
only to determine the relevance of the documents
aid not attempt to locate contradictions.
In his concurring opinion in Palermo v. United
Stales,"' Justice Brennan explained what may have
been the reason for the Congress' limited response:
It is true that our holding in Jencks was not
put on constitutional grounds, for it did not
have to be; but it would be idle to say that the
commands of the Constitution were not dose
to the surface of the decision; indeed, the
Congress recognized its Constitutional over-
tones in its debates on the statute.
18 2
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority in
Palmero, stated that the Jencks Act merely put in
statutory form what the Court had meant in its
decision in Jencks v. United States"' and that the
statute was called for after some lower federal
courts allowed demands far beyond the holding in
. the Jencks decision. l" Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
interpretation of the purpose and scope of the
Jencks Act is reflected in the Court's decision in
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States."' There
the Court held that the trial court did not err in
denying a defense motion for production of a trial
witness' grand jury testimony. The Court sup-
ported this decision by arguing that the Jencks Act
had defined the limits of the disclosure and that
more liberal rules would restrict the effectiveness
of the grand jury. However, in 1966, Dennis v.
-t360 U.S. 343, 360 (1959) (Brennan, J., joined by
Warren, C. J., Black and Douglas, J. J., concurring.)11 Id. at 362-63. Some writers have suggested that
Jencks may become a constitutional requirement.
See, Fletcher, Pre-trial Discorery in State Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293, 303 (1960).
181 353. U.S. at 345-46.
I" See, H. R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957), and S. RElP. No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
( 1957). See also S. REP. No. 981, 85th.Cong.,. 1st Sess.
1957); 103 CoNG. REc. 15939-41 .(1957).
18360 U.S. 395 (1959).
United States'8 6 established the general rule that
the grand jury testimony of a trial witness should
be disclosed. After citing increased allowance of
disclosure in lower federal courts, Justice Fortas,
speaking for the majority, said, "These develop-
ments are entirely consonant with the growing
realization that disclosure rather than suppression
of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the
proper administration of criminal justice." 18
It should be emphasized that these decisions
and legislative enactments have not created a sys-
tem of pre-trial discovery of any sort; rather, they
have authorized at-trial disclosure of information
for impeachment purposes. The Jencks Act spe-
cifically prohibits pre-trial disclosure of documents
covered by the statute.l
Actual pre-trial discovery in federal courts"19
began with the amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which became effective in
July, 1966.191 Among these, the important rules for
discovery purposes were amended Rule 16 and new
Rule 17.1.
Amended Rule 16 provides, in summary, that
(a) upon motion of a defendant, the court "may"
order the attorney for the government to permit
186 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
"8 Id. at 870.
"s18 U.S.C. § 3500 (a) (1964) provides:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States no statement... in the possession of the
United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other
than the defendant) to an agent of the Government
shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or in-
spection until said witness has testified on direct
examination in the trial of the case.
"'9 The limited scope of federal criminal discovery
under the rules and Jencks was criticized by Chief
justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in
1964:
The statutory law and the Federal Rules, inade-
quate not only in themselves but in combination
and diluted further by paltry interpretation, have
led only to the most rudimentary form of criminal
discovery. It ekes out an exstence" in a still un-
favorable enviroment. Judges continue to bar dis-
covery upon the rationalization at odds with the
apparent intention of the draftsman of the rules,
that failure to authorize discovery is an implied
prohibition of it.... [Tihe future of discovery in
federal prosecutions looks unpromising so long as
the federal courts fail to exercise their inherent
power to foster a wholesome intergration of dis-
covery procedures into the judicial process.
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Dis-
covery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 228, 239 (1964). This was
was written, of course, before Dennis v. United States
and before the new Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure were adopted by the Supreme Court.
190 The rules, together with the dissent of justice
Douglas, are reported at 39 F.R.D. 69, 252 ff.
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the defendant to inspect and copy any "relevant"
(1) written or recorded statement of the defendant
within the control of the government and which is
known, "or by the exercise of due diligence may
become known" to the prosecution, (2) results of
"physical or mental examinations, and of scientific
tests or experiments" within the control of the
government and which are known "or by the exer-
cise of due diligence may become known" to the
prosecution, and (3) the grand jury testimony of
the defendant; (b) upon motion of a defendant,
the court "may" order the attorney for the govern-
ment to permit the defendant to inspect and copy
"books, papers, documents, tangible objects,
buildings or places" within the control of the
government upon a showing of "materiality to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is
reasonable", except that "internal government
documents" and statements by government wit-
nesses not falling within the Jencks Act may not
be ordered disclosed; (c) if the court orders dis-
closure under (a) (2) or (b), upon motion of the
government, it may "condition its order" by re-
quiring that the defendant permit inspection of
"scientific or medical reports, books, papers, docu-
ments, tangible objects" or copies of these which
he "intends to produce at the trial and which are
within his possession, custody or control, upon a
showing of materiality to preparation of the
government's case and that the request is reason-
able," except internal defense documents and
statements of witnesses; (d) in its order, the court
may specify the time, place and manner; (e) the
court may make protective orders and the prose-
cution may move for such an order in the form of a
written statement for in camera inspection by the
court; and (g) there is to be a continuing duty to
disclose when new material is located, enforced by
a second order to disclose, followed by a continu-
ance, order prohibiting introduction into evidence
of the withheld material or other order deemed
necessary.
At first glance, Rule 16 would seem to still be
discretionary with the trial court. Even subsection
(a), which authorizes unconditioned discovery of
the items covered, contains the "may". It has been
suggested, however, that a comparison of subsec-
tion (a) with the other subsections and with the
earlier Rule 16, dictates a more limited view of the
court's discretion. 9' Subsection (a) does not con-
191 Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 54 Gxo L.J. 1276, 1277 (1966).
tain the requirement that the demand be shown
to be "reasonable" as is required for disclosures
under subsections (b) and (c) and as was required
under old Rule 16. Because of the apparent lib-
eralization of disclosures, it has been suggested
that subsection (a) may be relatively absolute,
subject only to protective orders.1 12 Several recent
decisions, however, have held that disclosure
should not be granted routinely upon the defend-
ants' request,'9 3 and that broad discretion remains
with the court.
While subsection (a) requires only that demands
for disclosure be "relevant," subsection (b) re-
quires a showing of reasonableness and materiality.
However, because the defendant has no power to
take depositions or interrogatories on which to
base his motions, these requirements of reason-
ableness and materiality must be given a liberal
construction if the subsection is to provide ef-
fective discovery. 94
Another important provision of amended Rule
16 is the authorization for reciprocal discovery.
The defendant may move for examination of his
own statements and grand jury testimony with-
out showing them to be material or his request
reasonable; but when he asks for physical or men-
tal tests or scientific reports under (a) (2) or other
evidence under (b), he then gives the court power
to condition his request upon his willifigness to
disclose.
Justice Douglas, in a statement accompanying
the new Rules of Criminal Procedure, objected
to Rule 16.
The prosecution's opportunity to discover
evidence in the possession of the defense is
somewhat limited in the proposal with which
we deal in that it is tied to the exercise by the
defense of the right to discover from the prose-
cution. But if discovery, by itself, of informa-
tion in the possession of the defendant would
violate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, is it any less a violation if conditioned on
the defendant's exercise of the opportunity
to discovery evidence? May benefits be condi-
tioned on the abandonment of constitutional
rights?195
192 Id.
11 United States v. Carrean, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 408,
413 (1967); See also, United States V. Kaminsky, 275
F. Supp. 365 (1967); and United States v. Diliberto,
264 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1
4 Rezneck, supra note 191, at 1279.
195 39 F.R.D. 276, 277.
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Despite this possible difficulty, Rule 16 does at-
tempt to meet the fear sometimes expressed that
discovery may discourage preparation. Internal
documents, reports and memoranda are exempted
'from discovery in subsections (b) and (c). The
exemptions thus provided restrict federal criminal
discovery in the same manner that Hickman v.
Taylor' limited federal civil discovery.
A further advantage of new rule 16 is the re-
quirement of due diligence placed on the govern-
ment attorney. Both subsections (a) (1) and (a)
(2) require the government attorney to disclose
material which is either known to and controlled
by him, or which "by the exercise of due diligence
may become known" to him. This provision pre-
cludes "convenient ignorance" by the government
attorney.
Rule 16 contains several radical innovations in
federal criminal discovery. However, the effect of
the rule in enlarging the scope of discovery will
depend largely upon the willingness of the federal
district courts to experiment with it. Whether
caution will prevail over experimentation cannot
be accurately predicted. Nonetheless, though the
accumulated data is insufficient to support firm
conclusions, it appears that district courts have
often shown an unwillingness to allow discovery
to the extent authorized by the law.' 97
Critics of Rule 16 have speculated that subsec-
tion (c), which provides for reciprocity, may ac-
tually operate to discourage discovery in compli-
cated criminal cases, where discovery is most
needed. 9s They have pointed out that the rule
does not cover many of the discoverable items
which would be most valuable to the defense:
names of witnesses in non-capital cases, or the pre-
trial disclosure of Jencks Act statements 99
Neither does Rule 16 provide for disclosures which
may be required by the Constitution as interpreted
in Brady v. Maryland.00
The second important change in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure is new Rule 17.1,
which provides for pre-trial conferences on motion
of either party or the court. However, a conference
cannot be held where the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel. In order to assure the defense
196 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
197 Interviews with Assistant State's Attorneys and
federal judges, February and May, 1967 (names and
further ififormation available from author).
11 Rezneck, supra note 191, at 1289-90.199 Id.
200 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also, concurring opinion of
Justice Fortas in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
that the pre-trial conference will not be used as a
method for obtaining incriminating admissions,
-the rule provides that no admission made by the
defendant or his attorney at the conference may
be used against him unless reduced to writing and
signed by both the defendant and his attorney.
With these limitations, the rule apparently envi-
sions a conference not unlike those in civil cases.m
The rule provides that the court shall prepare and
file a memorandum of the matters agreed upon at
the conference.
While informal pre-trial conferences, usually in
the form of "plea bargaining" sessions, are not un-
common in criminal cases, Rule 17.1 is novel in
giving formal authorization and definition to the
process. The rule is still too new for an accurate
assessment of its value. Nevertheless, some at-
torneys are optimistic, based on experience with
informal pre-trial conferences in state courts.
These attorneys feel that Rule 17.1 may in fact
be more valuable in obtaining disclosure than new
Rule 16.212 In addition to promoting disclosure, such
conferences may contribute to narrowing the issues
at trial.2°O Attorneys also feel that the pre-trial
conference may contribute to settlement, or "plea
bargaining", in criminal cases. Such a result would,
of course, depend upon the willingness of the trial
court to permit this to be included in such con-
ferences.
2U
UsE o CIviL DIscovERY TooLs mN
ENFORCEMENT or DiscovERY
At present, where discovery is allowed in crimi-
nal proceedings, there are few regularized proce-
dures to ensure meaningful disclosure. Unless
diklosure is voluntary, discovery is generally by
motion in court to order the opposition to disclose
specified information. 0 5
In most states, discovery is a matter of discre-
tion with the trial court rather than a matter of
right.2°6 This situation prohibits regularized proce-
20 1 FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
2102 Interviews, supra note 197.
203 I.
204The American Bar Association has recommended
that judges not participate in plea disussions. ABA
PRojxcT ON MioNm STANDARDs FOR CRMqAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUaTr
§ 3. (Approved Draft, 1968).
2 P For a discussion of the contents of a defendant's
motion for discovery, see Garber, The Growth of Crimi-
nal Discovery, 1 Am. Csnx L.Q. 3, 23-25 (1962). An
affidavit is generally necessary to support such a
motion.
20 In most jurisdictions where criminal discovery
has been permitted the trial courts have led the way,
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dures such as depositions and interrogatories.
Since the proper scope of discovery remains unde-
fined courts are forced to determine what shall be
disclosed on a case by case basis.m It is also possi-
ble that the special characteristics of criminal cases
will dictate different procedures from those fol-
lowed in civil cases.
2 08
The primary discovery tools in civil cases are
depositions and interrogatories. Rules 26, 30, 31,
and 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
empower parties in civil cases to require other
parties and third persons to disclose information
which they may have regarding the dispute. No
jurisdiction has a criminal procedure rule analo-
gous to Civil Rules 30 and 31,209 which provide for
depositions on oral examination and for written
interrogatories. California courts, which have
broadened other areas of criminal discovery, have
specifically declined to allow the defendant to take
depositions.
210
Harris v. Nelson authorizes the use of inter-
rogatories in habeas corpus proceedings instituted
by state prisoners so that appropriate facts may
but in California the appellate courts seem to have
taken the initiative. See Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery
in State Criminal Cases, 12 STr. L. Pxv. 293 (1960);
Loulsell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Ap-
parent?, 49 CAIX" L. R.v. 56 (1961) and discussion
supra at page 16. Although many trial courts have
been reversed on appeal for allowing discovery in a
criminal case, many appellate courts are encouraging
the lower courts to exercise their discretion. State ex
rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d
887 (1954); People v. Johnson, 365 Mich. 619, 97
N.W.2d 739 (1959); Layman v. State, 335 P.2d 444
(Okla. Crim. 1960). The federal courts, on the other
hand, allow discovery only in isolated cases where the
moving party is able to particularize a need or interest.
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677
(1958). The Court in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S.
343, 354 (1959), said that "[I]t would indeed defeat...
[the Jencks Act's] design to hold that the defense may
see statements in order to argue whether it should
be allowed to see them."
207 See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228, 245 (1964). See, e.g.,
ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 114-10 to 114-13 (1967);
DEL SUPER. CT. (Cams.) R. 16, MD. R. P., R. 728.
200 For example, since the defendant has the right
not to incriminate himself, it may be necessary to
restrict the extent of discovery in a criminal case. Also,
differences from the civil practice may be necessary
since in a criminal proceeding one side, the state, has
greater means for fact finding.
205 A number of jurisdictions have statutes or court
rules authorizing the taking of depositions, at least by
the defendant. These are, however, similar to Federal
Rule 15 (a), in that they are designed to preserve
testimony, but not discover it. But see supra note 79.
210 Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739,
12 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1961).
be secured. 2 The decision does not apply Rule 33
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which is
limited by Rule 81 (a) (2) to apply only to habeas
corpus to
the extent that the practice in such-proceed-
ings is not set forth in statutes of the United
States and has heretofore conformed to the
practice in civil actions.72
But the Court noted that
in appropriate circumstances, a district court,
confronted by a petition for habeas corpus
which establishes a prima facia case for relief,
may use or authorize the use of suitable dis-
covery procedures, including interrogatories,
reasonably fashioned to elicit facts necessary
to help the court to 'dispose of the matter as
law and justice require.' 28 U.S.C. § 2243.21
Thus, in one unique situation the civil discovery
procedures have been incorporated into the crimi-
nal procedure.
As was pointed out earlier, the prosecution
generally has more effective means to obtain rele-
vant information from witnesses than does the
defense. If unable to obtain information volun-
tarily, the prosecution has the power to subpoena
recalcitrant witnesses to appear before a grand
jury or other investigatory body.27 4 As long as
grand jury testimony continues to be unavailable
211394 U.S. 286 (1969).
212 FED. R. Crv. P., 81(a) (2).
213Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969).
224 Only rarely can a defendant obtain a copy of the
grand jury testimony before the trial. Rule 6 (e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
disclosure of grand jury minutes to government attor-
neys, but makes disclosure to the defendant dependent
upon the discretion of the court. The Supreme Court in
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395 (1959), has said that such discretion should be
exercised only upon a showing of "particularized need."
There are two recognized needs at present: 1) A de-
fendant's testimony to the grand jury is disclosable
where the charge is that the defendant perjured him-
self by that testimony, United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d
617 (3d Cir. 1954); and 2) disclosure is sometimes
permitted upon a motion to dismiss the indictment,
though only where the grounds for dismissal are speci-
fied and the facts set forth with particularity, United
States v. Nasser, 301 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 923 (1962). The main reason for the Supreme
Court rule against discovery of grand jury testimony
is that the effective operation of the grand jury re-
quires secret proceedings. See United States v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). This reason-
ing is perhaps specious in light of the prosecution's
ready access to the grand jury proceedings and the
tendency by the prosecution to use these proceedings as
a deposition. Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Un-
reasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668 (1962).
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to the defense, at least before trial, the prosecution
will prefer to obtain its evidence in this 'manner
rather than by the taking of a deposition at which
the defense may be present.
The right to depose witnesses would be valuable
to the defendant since otherwise state witnesses
may be unwilling to talk to him or his attomey.
In the deposition of an unwilling witness in a civil
case a proper motion by the deponent will permit
him to treat such a person as a hostile witness and
question the witness as on cross-examination.u 6
This procedure could be extremely valuable to the
defense in a criminal case.
There probably is no valid objection to permit-
ting the defendant to depose an eyewitness to the
crnme.2 7 This procedure would give the defendant
adequate time in which to appraise the prosecu-
tion's evidence and to prepare a defense based on
such evidence. Depositions, however, also would
give certain defendants the necessary opportunity
and information to create a false defense which is
one danger motivating those who oppose extended
discovery. Opponents of liberalized discovery also
note that law enforcement officials and technicians
could not be deposed without the risk of revealing
the prosecution's full case. Despite these problems
it is clear that the maintenance of the status quo
with its grave inequity for the defendant is not a
final nor a desirable answer.
•215Those who oppose pretrial discovery generally
fear that it would give the defendant an undue ad-
vantage since his privilege against self-incrimination
would still* substantially insulate him from discovery,
he might resort to perjury and witness-tampering. See
State v. Tuner, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). This
advantage is perhaps countered by the prosecution's
broad power of investigation. See Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Crimi-
nal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). But in either
case there are not enough facts on which to base a
meaningful judgment. That is, the fear of the defend-
ant's'abusing pretrial discovery seems to be more a
priori than anything based in experience. See Brennan,
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 WAsH L. Q. 279.210 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c).
17 But see Traynor, supra note 189, at 245, in which
he justifies the refusal of California courts to allow
depositions of witnesses:
The prosecutor is directly involved in the conduct
of the action and is therefore subject at all times to
the inherent power of the court to regulate the
proceedings before it. Independent witnesses on
the other hand, may be strangers to the litigation
except when testifying, and the courts are under-
standably slow to invoke their inherent power to
expand compulsory process against such witnesses.
The question arises, however, whether witnesses in
civil cases, where they are subject to- subpoenas for
depositions are also "strangers to the litigation."
There also is no policy or constitutional objec-
tion to discovery depositions of third parties by
the prosecution, unless the depositions are to be
used at the trial in the absence of the witnessY
This may violate the constitutional guaranty that
a defendant is to be confronted by the witnesses
against him.2
9
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for production of documents and things
for inspection by the oposing party. A similar
procedure is provided in Rule 16 of the Federal
Criminal Rules,m which allows pretrial inspection
and copying of documents and other tangible ob-
jects in a few situations. Since Rule 34 depends
upon court order, its adaptation to criminal dis-
covery, which also proceeds upon court order,
would not necessitate serious revision in the ad-
ministration of the criminal law.
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes the court to order a party to submit to
physical or mental examination. Similarly statutes
or rules may require the defendant to sub-
mit to certain tests and examinations. Statutes
which require the defendant to submit to a blood
alcohol test have been ruled constitutional.2 1' The
defendant may be required to submit to a mental
examination if he claims to have been insane at
the time of the crime or incompetent to stand
tria.' At present, the defendant has no power to
require another, such as a witness or an alleged
victim, to submit to physical or mental examina-
tion. Since by the nature of a criminal proceeding
any person to be examined by the defense would
be someone other than a party, the courts or
legislatures may be reluctant to extend this power
to the defense despite its possible usefulness in
218 4 BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND iPOCEDURES
§ 2021 (1951).
219 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965); cf. 60 J. Crs. L.C. & P.S. 195 (1969).
220 Rule 16 is the only Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure for discovery, Bowman Dairy Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951), but it is hampered by the
proviso that the items sought must have belonged to or
have been obtained from the defendant, or have been
obtained from others by seizure or by process. Hence,
the purpose of Rule 16 is to protect the defendant's
property right in his own goods and to insure his access
to documents that the prosecution seizes from third
persons by subpoena. It does not facilitate the de-
fendant's discovery of documents important to his
defense. See United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962).
1
2 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
For a list of state statutes requiring examination,
see State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 11-14, 210 A.2d -63,
767, n.1 (1965).
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determining the extent of a victim's injury or the
credibility of a witness.
Civil Rule 36, which is rarely invoked in civil
cases, authorizes a party to request admissions of
fact or opinions on the genuineness of documents.lu
In criminal procedure a similar rule would be of
little practical value since the only sanction for
violation is the imposition of the costs of proving
the fact on the party unwilling to cooperate. A
monetary sanction would not influence either the
prosecution or the defense, especially where the
defendant is indigent since the expense of proof
probably will be borne by the government. Of
course, no sanction should induce the defendant to
ease the prosecutor's burden of coming forward
with the evidence.
Another procedure used in civil cases which may
be adaptable to criminal cases is the pretrial con-
ference.m Rule 17.1 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure allows the pretrial conference in
criminal procedure. Although there has been little
experience under Rule 17.1, it may become an
extremely useful device in criminal law. At the
conference the issues of the case are narrowed and
consequently, the element of surprise at the trial
is reduced. Most attorneys believe the conferences
helpful in effecting disclosure between the par-
ties.no Pleas of guilty also are frequently prompted
by such conferences.n 6 Instead of being limited to
disclosure as required in a specific court order, as
is the practice now,m the pretrial conference allows
greater flexibility because the parties can negotiate
disclosure without imposed restriction.
Some writers have suggested that the rules of
criminal procedure should incorporate the proce-
dures allowed in the civil rules.22 But full applica-
tion is impossible because the problems incident
to discovery in criminal cases are different from
those in civil suits. For example, while at first
thought depositions may seem useful additions to
criminal discovery, two different standards would
be required: one for the prosecution depositions
and one for the defense depositions. The dual
2Striegel, Request for Admissions-The Neglected
Tool of Discovery, 5 WAsHasuR L.J. 47 (1965).
22 FxD. R. Cx. P. 37
n21 Interviews, February to May, 1967, with United
States' Attorneys and federal district court judges
(further information available from author).
n6 Id. See also Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33
F.R.D. 56 (1963).
FWD f. R. Civ. P. 16.
m See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YAS;x L.J. 1149,
1192-97 (1960); 51 CALIF. L. ERv. 135, 141-44 (1963).
standards follow from the dictates of the Fifth
Amendmen02 and from the unequal ability of the
parties in obtaining relevant information. These
problems could limit the usefulness of interroga-
tories and depositions. The work product concept
also would require redefinition for use in, the crimi-
nal law since most evidence that the defendant
would want to inspect arises out of the prosecu-
tion's investigation.
Most disclosure is made by the prosecution and
it is enforced by the same methods as are other
procedural or due process requirements.23 0 Federal
Rule 16 (g) provides that if any party fails to com-
ply with a discovery order
the court may order such party to permit the
discovery or inspection of materials not previ-
ously disclosed, grant a continuance, or pro-
hibit the party from introducing in evidence
the material not disclosed, or it may enter
such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances.m
If the prosecution's failure to disclose is uncovered
after the trial, the conviction may be vacated and
a new trial ordered.
232
Enforcing the prosecutor's discovery of defense
evidence is more difficult. Some states require
disclosure of an alibi and most authorize the trial
court to refuse to permit the introduction of evi-
dence to establish a surprise alibi.23 This sanction
could be expanded to cover other required dis-
closures. Many feel that such a rule may be un-
necessarily harsh, even if constitutional. Critics
suggest that courts would be hesitant to use this
sanction and would rely on less stringent means of
enforcement 2 Other procedures to aid the prose-
cution if the defendant refuses to disclose include
granting a prosecution's motion for a continuance
until the defendant complies or permitting com-
ment in the presence of the jury upon the defend-
22 It is clear that the prosecution would be put at a
greater disadvantage were depositions allowed. His
witnesses would have to respond to the defendant's
questions while the defendant could invoke his privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
n0 See, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957), the "Jencks act",
in which a witness for the prosecution may not testify,
or his testimony may be stricken, if his prior state-
ments are not disclosed.
23
, FED. R. Clmu. P. 16 (g).
2 See e.g., Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
See 76 HAnv. L. Rxv. 838, 839 (1963).
- Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 54 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1276 (1966).
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ant's refusal. Both of these remedies, however,
are of uncertain value.
Also, refusal to obey discovery orders may be
punished through the court's contempt power.05
This might be effective in many cases, although
some defendants may prefer punishment for con-
tempt rather than make damaging disclosures in a
serious felony prosecution.
Disciplinary power over the defense attorney
might also be an effective means to enforce dis-
covery. 6 Obviously, this -sanction would be of
limited value. The defendant's attorney may not
know the information to be disclosed. This en-
forcement procedure would complicate the at-
torney-client relationship. For example, the client
may refuse to allow disclosure but the attorney
still may be unable to withdraw from the case.sa
To avoid such enforcement problems, California
decisions rely principally upon voluntary exchange
of information.ms Thus, the defendant would be
discouraged from refusing to. disclose evidence
primarily by being barred from receiving disclo-
sures from the prosecution. Similarly, in order to
enforce the requirement of continuing discovery,
the drafters of Federal Rule 16 were forced to
provide a continuing obligation of discovery where
under a conditional order the defendant has already
received the information sought from the govern-
ment and has not revealed matter ordered to be
provided.rs
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the early and adamant com-
mon law opposition to criminal discovery has been
modified both in England and in several American
jurisdictions. Indeed, many of the arguments
23 See, e.g., FED. R. CRnm. P. 16 (g).
236 See generally, FED R. C=ir. P. 16 (g).
= This would be analogous to the ethical problem of
permitting a criminal defendant to give perjured
testimony. See Freedman, Professional Responsibility
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 Mca. L. Rav. 1469 (1966).
2a Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d
919 (1962).
20The Note of Advisory Committee on Rules in
18 U.S.C.A. Rule 16 (g) provides that there is a con-
tinuing obligation on a party subject to a discovery
order with respect to material discovered after initial
compliance. The note also states that the rule gives wide
discretion to the court in dealing with the failure of
either party to comply with a discovery order. "Such
discretion will permit the court to consider the reasons
why disclosure was not made, the extent of other
prejudice, if any, to the opposing party-, the feasibility
of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any
other relevant circumstances."
advanced in support of strict restraints on criminal
discovery are not sound. In particular, they con-
flict with the presumption of innocence which is
fundamental to the Anglo-American system of
justice. While Lord Kenyon stated that criminal
discovery would subvert the whole system of
criminal law by allowing more defendants to es-
cape conviction, it appears that discovery is
more significant in the preparation of the case of
an innocent accused than that of'one who is guilty.
Those American jurisdictions that have recog-
nized the weakness-in arguments against criminal
discovery asserted that fairness to the defendant
demanded that he be allowed access to certain in-
formation. In response, several states and the
federal government enacted statutes providing for
limited discovery.10
The Supreme Court spoke on the matter in
Brady v. Maryland24 providing the furthest exten-
sion of the defendant's rights to criminal discovery.
That decision established a defendant's right to
all evidence in the possession of the prosecution
that is material to his guilt or punishment. Yet,
most states have not provided adequate and effec-
tive means for a defendant to assert his right to
discovery in response to the Brady decision.
The American Bar Association has drafted a
set of standards for pre-trial discovery in view of
the states' failure to codify a defendant's discovery
rights.Y The Bar committee noted:
In order to bring potential constitutional
issues to the fore at the earliest practical time,
and to make for appropriate and enduring
dispositions, it seemed essential that defense
•counsel receive as much information about
the case as feasible before trial or other dispo-
sition. 43
There are two significant concepts implicit in this
statement of purpose. First, it recognizes that
inadequate pre-trial discovery violates due process.
Secondly, it underscores the policy behind ex-
panded post conviction relief which is to rectify
constitutional errors regardless of when they are
raised.2"
210 See, supra notes 172 and 207.
24 See p. 22 supra and note 123.
2., AmcAN BAR AssocrAToN PROJECT ON MnI-
MUM STANDARDS FOR CR.nITNAL JusTICE DiscovaRY
AND PRocauRE BEroRE TRuL (Tentative Draft
May, 1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA Standards].
2
1
3 Id. at 2.
2144 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969);
cf. 61 J. CRw. L., C. & P.S. 51 (1970).
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Finality and efficiency in criminal law adminis-
tration require full and fair disclosure as early as
possible in a criminal prosecution. This require-
ment for discovery is expressed in Section 1.2 which
states the general policy that "discovery prior to
trial should be as full and free as possible consistent
with protection of person, effective law enforce-
ment, the adversary system, and national se-
curity." 245 In order to effectuate this policy, the
rules outline a broad range of procedures imposing
obligations of disclosure upon prosecution and
defense.26 The obligations reveal the intent of the
Committee to encourage voluntary pre-trial ex-
change of relevant information in order to avoid
time consuming recourse to the courts.w
The disclosures that may be required of the
defendant under standard 3.1 are non-testimonial
in character. They include provisions for appear-
ance in a line up, speech for identification by wit-
nesses, fingerprinting, and photographs. A defend-
ant might also be called upon to try on articles
of clothing, permit the taking of specimens of
material from under the fingernails, give hand-
writing specimens, allow for access to samples of
blood or hair, and submit to reasonable physical
or medical inspection of his body.
The Committee asserted:
Although this standard [3.1] deals with mat-
ters customarily regarded as investigative
procedures rather than pretrial discovery,
both conceptually and practically there is no
reason why they should be viewed in such
limited fashion. In the sense that the proce-
dure involves the acquisition of material and
information before trial other than by ex-
changes between opposing counsel, it is no
different from the taking of depositions,
which has long been the heart of pretrial dis-
covery in civil cases.na
Prosecuting authorities will be aided by the
proposal's precise statement of what the prosecu-
tion can demand of a defendant since section 3.1
contemplates the creation of an enforceable legal
right to such disclosures. Courts will be empowered
to enforce compliance through traditional con-
tempt sanctions.mO Contempt will also be available
2 ABA STAmAPSD § 1.2.
246 Id. parts II & III (Introduction).
27 Id.at 54 (Commentary), § 2.1.
m Id. § 3.1 (Commentary).24
9 Id. § 4.7 and Commentary.
against defense attorneys who advise their clients
not to cooperate in the required disclosures.
Standard 3.2 provides:
Subject to constitutional limitations, the
trial court may require that the prosecuting
attorney be informed of and permitted to
inspect and copy or photograph any reports or
results, or testimony relative thereto, of
physical or mental examinations or of scientific
tests, experiments or comparisons, or any
other reports or statements of experts which
defense counsel intends to use at a hearing
or trial.
250
This standard was adapted from Rule 16(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It would
operate on the premise that the defendant may be
required to disclose before trial that which he would
usually reveal later at trial. The Committee
argued that "to the extent material or information
does not originate with the accused, there is no
constitutional impediment to its disclosure.s
The report conceded, however, that there is some
doubt about the constitutionality of what has been
termed the "advanced notice" theory.
These standards place no conditions on the
discovery powers as outlined. The prosecution is
entitled to the information allowed it whether or
not the defendant also seeks discovery. Similarly,
the defendant's right to disclosure is not condi-
tioned upon his own willingness to divulge informa-
tion. In this regard, the proposals are quite differ-
ent from the discovery authorized by Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or
from that authorized by judicial decision in Cali-
fornia.25
On the other hand, standard 2.1 requires of the
prosecutor, subject to certain limitations, disclo-
sure of the names and addresses of persons whom
the prosecuting attorney intends to call as wit-
nesses, together with their relevant written or
recorded statements. The proposals also demand
that the prosecution provide statements made by
the accused or a co-defendant, the grand jury
testimony of the accused, and the relevant portions
of the testimony of witnesses whom the prosecution
intends to call. Reports of experts on physical,
mental, and scientific tests; documents, photo-
graphs and tangible objects which belong to the
250 Id. § 3.2.
251 Id. §.3.2 (Commentary).
252 See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 372
P.2d 919 (1962).
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defendant or which the prosecution intends to use
in a trial or hearing; and the prior criminal records
of witnesses may also be solicited.
Furthermore, section (b) of Standard 2.1 re-
quires the prosecution to notify the defense
whether any evidence was provided by an inform-
ant, if there was relevant grand jury testimony
which has not been transcribed, and if there has
been any electronic surveillance of the premises of
the accused or of conversations to which he was
party. This subsection aids the defendant in re-
solving the issue of the propriety of the prosecu-
tion's evidence before trial.
An additional requirement under subsection (c)
of 2.1 must be noted. The prosecution is compelled
to reveal material "which tends to negate the guilt
of the accused as to the offense charged or would
tend to reduce his punishment therefore." That
provision covers the type of disclosure required
under Brady v. Maryland.20 There is an extension
of Brady here only in that 2.1(c) would require
pretrial disclosure, while the Supreme Court there
was concerned specifically with disclosure at trial.
A defendant's rights of discovery under 2.1 go
beyond those items actually in the possession of
the prosecutor. Subsection (d) extends the disclo-
sure obligation to matters in the possession of
"members of his staff" or others who have partici-
pated in the investigation or evaluation of the case
and who either regularly report... or have re-
ported to his office." This will necessitate the
adoption of procedures by which law enforcement
agencies which have reported or who normally
report to the prosecutor will inform him of all
information which must be d.1sclosed, as well as
information necessary for succ essful prosecution.
Responsibility for creating and maintaining such
procedures rests with the prosecuting attorney.
Disclosures mentioned under Standard 2.1 are
mandatory and do not depend upon a request
from the defense. Standard 2.3, however, lists
additional disclosures which are mandatory upon
the prosecutor only in response to a specific request
by the defendant or his attorney. Information
regarding searches and seizures, the acquisition of
specified statements from the accused, and the
relationship of specified persons to the prosecuting
authority fall within that category.
The Advisory Committee contemplated that
mandatory disclosures by the prosecution under
2.1 and 2.3 would normally require.no judicial ac-
2- 373 U.S. 83 (1963)..
tion. Knowing what he is required to release to the
defendant's attorney, the prosecutor would be
required to reveal the information as a matter of
course. Should the prosecutor object to the release
of any matter, he can seek a protective order under
Standard 4.4.
In accordance with Standard 2.2(a), the prosecu-
tion must make mandatory disclosures as soon as
practicable after the filing of charges. Subsection
(b) of that provision permits performance of the
obligation in any manner mutually agreeable with
the defense counsel. With those matters that must
be disclosed independent of a defense request,
the information is to be made available for inspec-
tion, copying, or testing at reasonable times upon
notice to the defense attorney.
A radical departure from traditional concepts of
criminal discovery is found in section 2.5. It pro-
vides that the court in its discretion may demand
the disclosure of information which is not otherwise
covered if the defendant can show that the informa-
tion sought is material to the preparation of his
defense. This discretionary authority accorded the
trial court is broad enough to permit discovery of
evidence in the possession of persons who are not
employed by or in contact with the prosecutor's
office. 25 Where such evidence is involved, the court
may permit the taking of depositions.
25
The Advisory Committee drew heavily on Rule
16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
in imposing the requirement in 2.5 that the defense
make a showing of materiality. The section may
prove unworkable in light of that requirement. The
defendant will often have difficulty establishing
materiality in the absence of a general deposition
p'ower.15
These standards represent far reaching proposals
in the area of criminal discovery. They have been
put to a practical test in a two year experiment by
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California. The experiment' tends to
show the viability of the Standards:
Although the collection of conclusive data has
not been possible, in the opinion of the judges
and of many lawyers involved, the new proce-
dures and the expanded discovery appear to be
working well and fulfilling the objectives
tought: increasing the efficiency of the judges
214 ABA STANqDARDS, § 2.5 (Commentary).
256 Id.
256 Rezneck, The New Federal Rides of Critnina
Procedure, 54 GEo. L. J. 1276 (1966).
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and lawyers, speeding up the process, improv-
ing the performance of defense counsel, elimi-
nating a substantial amount of paperwork,
making trials shorter and more to the point,
and increasing the number of guilty pleas-
all apparently without any sacrifice of the
interests of the government or the defendant.
It is too early, perhaps, to evaluate the impact
of these procedures upon the finality of con-
victions, but it is believed that all constitu-
tional issues which can be anticipated have
been considered. 2 7
The full implementation of these or similar
proposals would seem to be a feasible means for
protecting the innocent defendant from a wrongful
conviction.
2n ABA STA RDs, Part III (Introduction).
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